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I. INTRODUCTION
The law of unincorporated business organizations has undergone fundamental
change during the last decade. Ten years ago, firms could be organized as general
partnerships, limited partnerships, or corporations. Now, at the end of the decade,
traditional general partnership law has been reworked,' general partnerships have
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of Colorado; LL.M., 2000, Yale University. I would like to thank Maureen Sullivan.
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1. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") first
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* been mutated into limited liabilitypartnerships ("LLP")2 and limitedpartnerships into
limited liability limited partnerships ("LLLP"),3 and a new form, the limited liability
company ("LLC"), has been created.' Responding to these changes and creations,
promulgated the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA") in 1994, and pronounced it ready
for adoption bythe states. REVISEDUNIF. P'sHIPAcT (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 35-152 (Supp.
2000). A majority ofthe states have adopted some version of the RUPA, including section 403,
which contains partner disclosure obligations and information rights, and section 404, which
sets forth general standards for partner conduct. See id., 6 U.L.A. 1 (providing a table listing
states that have adopted the RUPA); ROBERT W. HILLMAN, ALLAN W. VESTAL & DONALD J.
WEIDNER, THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT (2000). For discussions of entity
proliferation, see William H. Clark, Jr., What the Business World Is Looking for in an
Organizational Form: The Pennsylvania Experience, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 149 (1997)
(describing entity forms under Pennsylvania law); Robert R. Keatinge, Corporations,
Unincorporated Organizations, and Unincorporations: Check the Box and the Balkanization
of Business Organizations, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 201 (1997) (describing entity
forms under Colorado law).
2. Texas enacted LLP legislation in 1992. TEX. REV. CrV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n (2000).
See Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at the Birth
(Nearly), 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1067 (1995). Since the Texas enactment, all fifty states
have modified their partnership statutes to permit general partnerships to register as LLPs,
thereby affording limited liability protection to partners. For a list of state LLP statutes, see J.
WILLIAM CALLISON, PARTNERSHI LAW AND PRACTICE: GENERALAND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
§ 30A.01, at 30A-2 n.3 (1992). The LLP statutes afford different levels of liability protection,
although the trend is toward "full-shield" protection. As with partnerships and LLCs, there is
movement toward uniformity in LLP provisions, and in 1996 the NCCUSL passed amendments
to the RUPA creating an LLP act. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 306(c), 6 U.L.A. 66; see, e.g.,
HILLMAN, VESTAL & WEIDNER, supra note 1, at 361-62. Although LLP statutes reverse the
historic principle that general partners are jointly, orjointlyand severally, liable for partnership
debts, obligations, and liabilities, because LLPs are partnerships the LLP and the partners
remain subject to partnership disclosure and fiduciary duty rules. The default rule for general
partnership remains partner liability. See, e.g., CAILISON,supra, § 30A.01, at30A-2 n.3 (listing
states with LLP legislation).
3. Several states permit limited partnerships to register as LLLPs, see CALLISON, supra
note 2, § 30A.05, at 30A-10 (indicating states with LLLP legislation), thereby preventing
general partners in limited partnerships from having joint and several liability for limited
partnership debts and obligations. Although the default rule remains general partner liability,
this is under discussion by the NCCUSL as part of its limited partnership law drafting
project. See Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Partnerships Revisited, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 953,970-72
(1999).
4. In 1988, the Internal Revenue Service announced that LLCs can combine limited
liability protection for all owners with favorable partnership tax status. Rev. Rul. 88-76,1988-2
C.B. 360. Prior to Revenue Ruling 88-76, the Internal Revenue Service posited that some
owner needed personal liability for the entity's debts and obligations before partnership tax
classification could be obtained. See J. WILLIAM CALUSON& MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, LIMITED
LIABILIY COMPANIES: A STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 12.11 (1994)
[hereinafter CA.LUSON& SULLIVAN, STATE-BY-STATE]. After Revenue Ruling 88-76, the LLC
form became popular, and by 1996 all fifty states and the District of Columbia had enacted
LLC legislation. See J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES: STATE STATUTES AND FEDERAL MATERIALS (1999) [hereinafter CALLISON &
SULLIVAN, LIMITED LIABILrY COMPANIES] (containing all state LLC statutes). Many LLC
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work has commenced on fundamental revisions to limited partnership law.' Finally,
the process of combining the separate business organization forms into a single
unified form has begun.'
Measured merelybypopular acceptance, these reform efforts have been successful.
All fifty states have adopted the limited liability company and limited liability
statutes have been amended at least once since enactment, typically to track more lenient
federal income tax classification rules and the Internal Revenue Service's recognition that
single-member LLCs can be disregarded for federal income tax purposes. See Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-2 (1998). Some LLC statutes are amended frequently. For example, the Delaware
LLC act was enacted in 1993 and amended in 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999; the
Virginia LLC act was enacted in 1991 and amended in 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997,
1998, and 1999; and the Colorado LLC act was enacted in 1990 and amended in 1994 and
1997. The state LLC statutes contain various formulations of information disclosure rules and
member and manager fiduciary duties. See infra Part II.B. In August 1994, the NCCUSL
promulgated a Uniform Limited Liability Company Act ("ULLCA"), UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co.
ACT, 6A U.L.A. 429 (1995), containing its own information disclosure and fiduciary duty
rules. Id. §§ 408-09, 6A U.L.A. 462. Several states, including Alabama, Hawaii, Illinois,
Montana, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia, have enacted
ULLCA-based LLC statutes, either initially or by replacing their original LLC statutes with the
ULLCA, and more may do so in the future. The ULLCA was introduced after most states had
already enacted LLC legislation, and at this time has had relatively little effect on preexisting
state LLC statutes. In this regard, it can be compared with the RUPA, which has been enacted
in a majority of the states.
5. In 1995 the need to revise the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act ("RULPA")
because of changes in the underlying partnership law was suggested. Allan W. Vestal, A
Comprehensive Uniform Limited Partnership Act? The Time Has Come, 28 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1195 (1995). The NCCUSL has initiated the process. REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'sHIP
ACT(ProposedRevisionsDraftMar. 2000), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulcframe.htm
("Re-RULPA"). There have been several drafts of the Re-RULPA. The NCCUSL has ordered
the drafters to de-link the RULPA from the general partnership act. Vestal, supra, at 1029.
6. A "universal business entity" may be the newest business organization form on the
horizon. The Texas legislature considered a universal business entity bill in 1999, H.B.
2681, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999), http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlo/76r/billtext/
HB0268lI.HTM, and will likely enact a business entity statute in 2001, see H.B. 327, 2001
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001), http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlo/77r/billtext/ HB003271.HTM.
Colorado and other states have been experimenting with statutes homogenizing certain shared
business organization characteristics. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-90-102 to -201 (1999).
Proponents of the universal business entity entertain drafting a "one-entity-fits-all" statute that
would allow complete statutory flexibility without artificial distinctions among corporations,
general partnerships, LLPs, limited partnerships, LLLPs, and LLCs. See, e.g., Thomas F.
Blackwell, The Revolution Is Here: The Promise of a Unified Business Organization Law, 24
IowAJ. CORP. L. 333 (1999); Keatinge, supra note 1; Robert R. Keatinge, UniversalBusiness
Organization Legislation: WillItHappen? Why and When, 23 DEL. CoRP.L. 29 (1998); John
H. Matheson & Brent A. Olsen, A Call for a Unified Business Organization Law, 65 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1996); Dale A. Oesterle & Wayne M. Gazur, What's in a Name?: An
Argument for a Small Business "Limited Liability Entity" Statute (with Three Subsets of
Default Rules), 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 101 (1997). It is likely that any statutes enacted as
a result of this process will incorporate disclosure and fiduciary duty rules and that the




partnership innovations, the Internal Revenue Service has abandoned the field by
conceding favorable partnership tax treatment,7 and practitioners are using the new
forms without any apparent hesitation. However, there remains an undercurrent of
dissatisfaction with these reforms. Part of this dissatisfaction stems from aperception
that the reform process itself was flawed as drafters freely borrowed from existing
business organization and commercial statutes without focusing on the theoretical
underpinnings of the various forms.' This Article examines the process through
which various corporate and partnership features were combined to create new
unincorporated business organization forms. The discussion focuses on two aspects
shared by all business organizations, namely the information access rights and
information use restrictions of owners and managers, and on one business
organization form, the limited liability company.
This Article commences by examining the information access rights and use
restrictions of participants under the ULLCA. It is our position that these ULLCA
access rights and use restrictions are seriously and facially flawed, and that the flaws
are the result of the drafters combining provisions from dissimilar business
organization forms without an adequate underlying theory of the new LLC form. We
then consider the history of state adoptions of non-ULLCA-based LLC statutes to
determine whether any trend can be discerned on the question of information access
rights and use restrictions. It is our position that the state LLC statutes are uneven on
these points, and that they do not as a group evidence an adequate underlying theory
of the LLC form. This absence of an agreed-upon theory, the want of a clearly
7. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1986); see J. William Callison, New Entity Classification
Regulations, CoLo. LAW., April 1997, at 3.
8. Professors Dale Oesterle and Wayne Gazur have noted the lack of scholarly and
popular debate about LLCs:
The LLC was propelled through legislatures by a force of accountants, tax
lawyers, and business development lobbies that met little organized opposition.
Although sharing both partnership and corporate characteristics, the LLC was a
new entity. The newness appeared to be part of the allure, and there was little
scholarly debate over the desirable contours of the legislation in advance of
enactment.
Oesterle & Gazur, supra note 6, at 105; see also Larry E. Ribstein, The Emergence of the
Limited Liability Company, 51 Bus. LAW. 1 (1995) (noting the rapid emergence of the LLC
form). The Colorado experience was perhaps typical. The Colorado LLC act was drafted by a
group of tax lawyers in late 1989 and enacted in 1990. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 7-80-101, -1101
(West 1999). The drafters recognized the client benefits of combining limited liability
protection and partnership tax treatment, knew that there were unresolved issues and that
further "clean-up" legislation would be required, and made an appropriate political decision
to push ahead with early enactment. Even the raison d'etre of the LLC form, limited liability
protection, received little scholarly attention while the states were enacting LLC legislation.
It was only after most states had enacted LLC legislation that any scholarly analysis of limited
liability emerged. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, An Inquiry into the
Efficiency of the Limited Liability Company: Of Theory of the Firm and Regulatory
Competition, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 629 (1997); Robert W. Hamilton & Larry E. Ribstein,
Limited Liability and the Real World, 54 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 687 (1997); Susan Saab
Fortney, Seeking Shelter in the Minefield of Unintended Consequences-the Trap ofLimited
Liability Law Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 717 (1997).
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articulated and generally supported purpose, is a failure common to the business
organization reforms of the last decade.
Having suggested the absence of an underlying theory as one cause of the flaws in
the information access rights and use restrictions under the ULLCA, we turn to a
discussion of two competing models for structuring the rights and obligations of
participants in unincorporated business organizations. The first, more traditional,
model is a community model. The second model is individualistic and is based on
party autonomy. We explore both models, place them in the context of the historical
development ofunincorporated finns, and conclude that a third model, whichwe term
a structural model and which synthesizes the autonomy and community ma dels, is the
more appropriate basis for analyzing the LLC information rights and use restrictions.
Finally, we suggest revisions to the ULLCA which would, if adopted, conform its
information disclosure and use restrictions to the appropriate structural model.
II. LLC MEMBERS' FIDUCIARY DuTES AND INFORMATION RIGHTS
UNDER THE ULLCA AND STATE LLC STATUTES
It cannot be denied that the LLC form has been well accepted by lawyers and
clients. The combination of direct control and limited liability presents clear
advantages over either the corporate or the partnership form for a wide range of
business firms.9 However, it would be a mistake to treat the popularity of the LLC
form as evidence that an underlying theory of the LLC has been well articulated or
generally accepted. It would also be a mistake to assume that the LLC form's
popularity means that there are not significant variations in the LLC statutes and
unresolved policy questions concerning the form's structure.
One example of the remaining unresolved issues arising from the LLC form is the
question of what should be the information rights, disclosure obligations, and general
fiduciary obligations of LLC participants. One answer is found in the ULLCA; other
answers are found in the various state LLC statutes. As we shall see, the former is
flawed and the latter do not present a clear and coherent picture.
A. Fiduciary Duties and Member Information Rights
Under the ULLCA
1. Fiduciary Duties Under the ULLCA
LLC management structures come in two varieties: member management and
manager management." In the member-managed LLC form, the firm's control
attributes in the form of operational management and agency authority are retained
by the members. In the manager-managed LLC form, control attributes generally are
9. See CALUSON & SULUrVAN, STATE-BY-STATE, supra note 4, § 2.23 (discussing LLC
uses),
10. UNIF. LTD. LIAR. CO. ACT § 101(1l1)-(12), 6A U.L.A. 432(1995) (defining "manager-
managed company" and "member-managed company").
11. Id. § 404(a), 6A U.L.A. 457.
2001]
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allocated to one or more managers, who may be, but need not be, members.' 2
Under the ULLCA, the fiduciary duties of members in member-managed LLCs and
of managers in manager-managed LLCs parallel those of general partners under the
RUPA. These participants owe the entity and the other members fiduciary duties of
loyalty" and care, 4 and are bound in the exercise of their duties to a nonfiduciary
obligation of good faith and fair dealing. 5
On the other hand, under the ULLCA the fiduciary duties ofnonmanager members
in manager-managed LLCs differ from anything found in the RUPA. The fiduciary
duties of these members are simple: they have none. The ULLCA provides that "[i]n
a manager-managed [limited liability company] ... a member who is not also a
manager owes no duties to the company or to the other members solely by reason of
being a member."' 6 Nonmanager members in manager-managed LLCs do apparently
have a good faith and fair dealing obligation, but only with respect to rights and not
duties. "A member shall discharge the duties to a member-managed company and its
other members under this [Act] or under the operating agreement and exercise any
rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing."'"
As under the RUPA, the ULLCA does not define the nonfiduciary obligation of
good faith and fair dealing.' Presumably the drafters of the ULLCAjoined with the
drafters of the RUPA in inviting the courts to develop the meaning of good faith and
fair dealing by case decisions.'9 Further, as with the RUPA the good-faith and fair-
dealing obligation is grounded in contract, and is not characterized as a fiduciary duty
arising from the parties' special relationship. 0 This contractual formulation can be
12. Id. § 404(b).
13. HILLMAN, VESTAL& WEIDNER, supra note 1, at 201. Compare UNEF. LTD. LIAB. CO.
AcT § 409(a)-(b), 6A U.L.A. 464, with REVISED UNIF. P'sim' ACT § 404(a)-(b) (amended
1997), 6 U.L.A. 79 (Supp. 2000).
14. HILLMAN, VESTAL& WEIDNER, supra note 1, at 201. Compare UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co.
ACT § 409(a), (c), 6A U.L.A. 464, with REVISED UNIF. P'sHIpACT § 404(a), (c), 6 U.L.A. 58.
15. HaiLMAN, VESTAL&WEIDNER, supra note 1, at 203-04. Compare UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co.
ACT § 409(d), 6A U.L.A. 464, with REVISED UN-t. P'SHI ACT § 404(d), 6 U.L.A. 58.
16. UNIE. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 409(h), 6A U.L.A. 464.
17. Id. § 409(d) (alteration in original). Although ULLCA section 409(d) speaks to a good-
faith and fair-dealing obligation with respect to duties as well as rights, this appears to be
trumped by the ULLCA section 409(h)(1) statement that nonmanager members owe no
fiduciary duties to the company or the other members.
18. HILLMAN, VESTAL&WEIDNER, supra note 1, at 203-04. Compare UNI. LTD. LIAB. Co.
ACT § 101, 6A U.L.A. 431 (no definition of good faith and fair dealing), with REVISED UNIF.
P'SHIP ACT § 101, 6 U.L.A. 10 (no definition of good faith and fair dealing).
19. REVISED UNIF. P's, ACT § 404 cmt. 4,6 U.L.A. 61 ("The meaning of'good faith and
fair dealing' is not firmly fixed under present law .... It was decided to leave the terms
undefined in the Act and allow the courts to develop their meaning based on the experience of
real cases."); HILLMAN, VESTAL& WEmNER, supra note 1, at 203-04; see J. William Callison,
Blind Men and Elephants: Fiduciary Duties Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, the
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act and Beyond, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 109,
141-53 (1997) (discussing numerous possible variations on good-faith obligation); Allan W.
Vestal, Law Partner Expulsions, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1083, 1117-34 (discussing good-
faith and fair-dealing obligation in partner-expulsion context).
20. REVISED UNItF. P'sHiP ACT § 404(d) cmt. 4, 6 U.L.A. 60-61; HILLMAN, VESTAL &
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seen to eviscerate a traditional good-faith fiduciary duty.2 In addition, as with the
RUPA provision from which ULLCA section 409 is grafted,' the formulation of
fiduciary duties is intended tobe statutory and exclusive, and to displace any common
law fiduciary obligations.'
2. Member Information Rights Under the ULLCA
The ULLCA drafters also looked to the RUPA for their starting point on member
information rights.' The information rights of LLC members divide into three parts.
First, members have an access right to inspect and copy any records maintained by
the LLC.' This right is not conditioned on the member's purpose or motive.'
Second, members have a right, without demand, to information from the LLC
concerning the LLC's business or affairs reasonably required for the proper exercise
of the member's rights and performance of the member's duties.27 Third, members
have a right to demand additional information from the LLC concerning the LLC's
business or affairs, except to the extent the information demanded is unreasonable or
WEIDNER, supra note 1, at 203.
21. HILLMAN, VESTAL & WEIDNER, supra note I, at 203; Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental
Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REv. 523,
546-49 (1993).
22. Compare UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409, 6A U.L.A. 464, with REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP
ACT § 404,6 U.L.A. 58.23. Ha.MAN, VESTAL& WEIDNER, supra note 1, at 200-01; see UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT
§ 409 cmt., 6A U.L.A. 465 ("Under subsections (a), (c) and (h), members and managers...
owe to the company and to the other members and managers only the fiduciary duties of loyalty
and care set forth in subsections (b) and (c) and the obligation of good faith and fair dealing
set forth in subsection (d).").
24. HILMAN, VESTL&WEIDNER, supra note 1, at 180-93. Compare UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO.
ACT § 408, 6A U.L.A. 462, with REVISED UNiF. P'SHIP ACT § 403,6 U.L.A. 56.
25. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 408(a), 6A U.L.A. 462. As with the RUPA, the ULLCA
does not require the LLC to maintain records. The official commentary states:
Recognizing the informality of many limited liability companies, subsection (a)
does not require a company to maintain any records. In general, a company
should maintain records necessary to enable members to determine their share of
profits and losses and their rights on dissociation. If inadequate records are
maintained to determine those and other critical rights, a member may maintain
an action for an accounting under Section 410(a). Normally, a company will
maintain at least records required by state or federal authorities regarding tax and
other filings.
Id. § 408 cmt., 6A U.L.A. 463.
26. The official commentary states:
The right to inspect and copy records maintained is not conditioned on a member
or former member's purpose or motive. However, an abuse of the access and copy
right may create a remedy in favor of the other members as a violation of the
requesting member or former member's obligation of good faith and fair dealing.
See Section 409(d).
Id.
27. Id. § 408(b)(1).
2001]
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otherwise improper under the circumstances." Unlike memberfiduciary obligations,
the ULLCA does not differentiate between members who participate in management
and members who do not, and all members have the same broad rights to
information.29 As with the RUPA,3" it is likely that the drafters would give the LLC
the burden of proving a member's demand unreasonable or improper-thereby
expanding prima facie member information rights. However, unlike the RUPA, only
the LLC, and not other members, is required to provide information concerning the
LLC's business and affairs. Thus, if a member has information which is relevant to
the conduct of the LLC's business there is no express disclosure requirement.
It should be noted that the ULLCA information provisions arguably correct several
problems in the RUPA. For example, the RUPA gives partners access to the
partnership's "books and records," '3 but does not define the term.32 The ULLCA, in
contrast, grants members access to its "records,"33 and defines the term broadly to
include all recorded information. 4 Further, the RUPA limits partnership-agreement
modifications to the book and record access requirements, but permits complete
modification of the information disclosure obligation.35 The ULLCA rectifies this
discrepancy by restricting operating agreement modifications to both the record
access provision and the information disclosure provisions.36 It is ironic that each of
these revisions expand and solidify the information rights of nonmanager members
in manager-managed LLCs, while the ULLCA simultaneously provides that such
members have no fiduciary duties to the LLC or the other members.
28. Id. § 408(b)(2). In addition, members have a right to make demand to the firm and
receive, at the firm's expense, a copy of any written operating agreement.Id. § 408(c). This has
noparallel inthe RUPA. Cf. REVISEDUNIF. P'sHIPACT § 403(b), 6 U.L.A. 56 (partnership may
charge for documents supplied).
29. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 408, 6A U.L.A. 462-63.
30. REVISED UNIF. P'sHIP ACT § 403 cmt. 3, 6 U.L.A. 57.
31. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 403,6 U.L.A. 56; HILLMAN, VESTAL& WEIDNER, supra
note 1, at 181-83.
32. REVISED UNIF. P'sHwP ACT § 101, 6 U.L.A. 10.
33. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 408(a), 6A U.L.A. 462.
34. Id. § 101(16), 6A U.L.A. 432 (defining "record" as information that is inscribed on
a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in per-
ceivable form). The commentary to ULLCA section 408 further states:
The obligation to furnish access includes the obligation to insure that all records,
if any, are accessible in intelligible form. For example, a company that switches
computer systems has an obligation either to convert the records from the old
system or retain at least one computer capable of accessing the records from the
old system.
Id. § 408 cmt., 6A U.L.A. 463.
35. REVISED UNIF. P'silP AcT § 103(b)(2), 6 U.L.A. 16 ("The partnership agreement may
not... unreasonably restrict the right of access to books and records under Section 403(b).
... "); HILLMAN, VESTAL & WEIDNER, supra note 1, at 186-87, 191-92.
36. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 103(b)(1), 6A U.L.A. 434 ("The operating agreement may
not .. unreasonably restrict a right to information or access to records under Section 408 ..
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3. A Lamb with Mandibles of Death
By giving nonmanager members ofmanager-managedLLCs the gossamer fiduciary
obligations of noncontrolling corporate shareholders and the extraordinarily broad
information rights of general partners in a structure which eviscerates the traditional
fiduciary duty of good faith, the ULLCA drafters created a very odd beast. They
borrowed from the RUPA without adequately considering the ways in which
manager-managed LLCs are-or should be considered-structurally different from
general partnerships. As a result, ULLCA adopted the RUPA concepts in two
respects that are individually plausible but which, in combination, create an
unexpected andpotentially dangerous result 7 In essence, the ULLCA gives members
a broad right to receive information but does not prevent them from using that
information for their personal benefit, potentially in competition with the LLC or to
usurp opportunities which otherwise could be pursued by the LLC. This anomaly is
caused by the ULLCA drafters' importation of RUPA concepts, together with many
of the problems and ambiguities created by those concepts, without attending to the
management and other distinctions between partnerships and LLCs. The ULLCA has
created the equivalent of a lamb with mandibles of death, and sooner or later
somebody is going to be eaten by the lamb." This could occur when, for example, a
nonmanager member requests and receives information that otherwise provides a
competitive advantage to the LLC, and then uses the information in the member's
own business activities.
It appears the drafters of the ULLCA recognized this dissonance between the
information rights and uses restrictions on nonmanager members in manager-
managed LLCs. In what may have been an attempt to fix this fairly basic problem, the
drafters add language to the official commentary to ULLCA section 408(a) that "an
abuse of the access and copy right may create a remedy in favor of the other members
as a violation of the requesting member['s]... obligation of good faith and fair
dealing."'39 There are several problems with this attempted fix.' First, the suggestion
is inconsistent with the apparent intent of the good-faith and fair-dealing language
which became ULLCA section 409(d). That language was taken from RUPA section
37. It would have been consistent to couple broad information access rights with broad
member use restrictions, or to couple narrow fiduciary obligations with limited information
access rights. The ULLCA did neither.
38. BILLWATTERSON, THE AUTHORITATIVE CALVIN AND HOBBES: A CALVIN AND HOBBES
TREASURY 116 (1990) ('Yep, mandibles of death, that's what he's got." (Calvin to Uncle Max,
with reference to Hobbes)).
39. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 408(a) cmt., 6A U.L.A. 463.
40. It should be noted that a similar provision occurs in the official commentary to the
RUPA. REVISED UNIF. P'suIp ACT § 404 cmt. 4, 6 U.L.A. 61 ("In some situations the
obligation of good faith includes a disclosure component. Depending on the circumstances, a
partner may have an affirmative disclosure obligation that supplements the Section 403 duty
to render information."). The two are distinguishable, however, since the RUPA commentary
is consistent with the argument that the information disclosure provisions of the RUPA were
not intended to displace the common law in this area, obviously not a consideration when
dealing with the LLC form. HIILMAN, VESTAL & WEIDNER, supra note I, at 189-90.
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404(d).4 The official commentary to RUPA section 404(d) makes it clear that the
RUPA good-faith and fair-dealing obligation is not a fiduciary duty but a contract
concept, and that it is not a separate and independent obligation.42 This formulation
has been criticized as being both conceptually flawed and somewhat internally
inconsistent.43 Second, the commentary suggestion appears to be an inappropriate use
of the official commentary. According to the rules of the NCCUSL, "[c]omments
should not be used as a substitute for or to modify any substantive provision in an
Act."" It is awkward to argue that the comment "an abuse of the access and copy
right may create a remedy in favor of the other members as a violation of the
requesting member or former member's obligation of good faith and fair dealing"
45
is not being used in an attempt to modify the statutory provision that "[i]n a manager-
managed company... a member who is not also a manager owes no duties to the
company orto the other members solely by reason ofbeing a member."' Third, taken
on its own terms the commentary is flawed since it addresses only information
acquired through the inspection and copying provision ofULLCA section 408(a) and
not the demand- and non-demand-driven disclosure obligations under the ULLCA
section 408(b). Finally, the commentary does not address the situation when a
nomnanager member acts in unarguable good faith to obtain information, and only
subsequently determines to use such information for his or her personal benefit.
Under ULLCA, the LLC would not be able to argue that the member breached a
fiduciary duty47 and would be limited to arguing that the member violated a more
general good-faith and fair-dealing obligation. The results are thereby rendered far
less certain and, at a very minimum, the statute's prophylactic quality is reduced.4
41. REVISED UNIF. P'sP AcT § 404(d), 6 U.L.A. 58 ("A partner shall discharge the duties
to the partnership and the other partners under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement
and exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing."
(alteration in original)).
42. Id. § 404 cmt. 4,6 U.L.A. 60.
43. See HuLmAN, VESTAL & WEIDNER, supra note 1, at 203 -04.
44. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, 1991-92 REFERENCE BOOK
81(1991).
45. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 408(a) cmt., 6A U.L.A. 463 (1995).
46. Id. § 409(h)(1), 6A U.L.A. 464 (Supp. 2000).
47. Cf Tri-Growth Centre City, Ltd. v. Silldorf, Burdman, Duignan & Eisenberg, 265 Cal.
Rptr. 330 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
While a limited partner normally would not be involved in the management or
otherwise participate in the partnership so as to incur fiduciary obligations to
other partners .... there can be factual scenarios where a limited partner might be
involved in the partnership in such a manner-for example, allowing him access
to confidential information-so as to create fiduciary duties.
Id. at 335 (citations omitted).
48. It might be argued that the parties can modify the odd statutory default in this regard.
Following the RUPA, the ULLCA provides that statutory provisions may be altered by the
operating agreement unless the provisions are included on a listing of statutory provisions as
to which the right to amend by agreement is limited. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 103(b)(1), 6A
U.L.A. 434. But the members' information rights are included in that listing: "The operating
agreement may not... unreasonably restrict a right to information or access to records under
Section 408 ... ." Id. Parties unwilling to depend in structuring their firm on what a court
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B. Fiduciary Duties and Member Information
Rights Under State LLC Statutes
As discussed above, the ULLCA's treatment of nonmanager-member information
access rights and use limitations is dangerously flawed. Particularly since most states
have not adopted the ULLCA, it is important to gauge whether the various state LLC
statutes provide a consistent and well-defined approach to information access and use
rules. The following discussion illustrates that they do not. Therefore, unless clear
and universal rules are not desirable, it is necessary to go beyond the ULLCA and the
present state LLC acts in an attempt to derive such rules.
1. State Fiduciary Duty Enactments
Nine states have adopted ULLCA-based LLC statutes. The forty-one states which
have adopted non-ULLCA-based LLC statutes deal with the fiduciary duties of
participants in a wide variety of ways. Nine state LLC statutes ignore the matter
altogether,49 although the same states have statutory provisions governing the
fiduciary duties of partners in general partnerships, general partners in limited
partnerships, and directors and officers in corporations. The remaining thirty-two
states regulate some aspect of the participants' fiduciary duties, but vary significantly
in the scope and content of the regulation. The statutoryprovisions of many of these
states can be traced to an origin in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act
("RMBCA") provisions on the standards of conduct of directors and officers.50
would hold to be a "reasonable" restriction on information would be required to address the
asymmetry by increasing the duties ofnonmanager members. There is no indication under the
ULLCA that parties to an operating agreement cannot increase fiduciary obligations or define
the good-faith and fair-dealing obligation. However, these modifications require ex ante
contracting and, even when considered, raise the transaction costs of using the LLC form.
49. The Arizona, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, New Mexico, Nevala, Texas, Utah, and
Wyoming LLC acts make no reference to member or manager fiduciary duties. These states
therefore leave the duty question to the operating agreement or to judicial common-law
development. In addition, prior to their adoptions of the ULLCA, the Alabama, South Dakota,
and West Virginia LLC acts fell into this category.
50. The RMBCA differentiates only slightly between the standards of conduct applicable
to directors and officers:
General Standards for Directors
(a) A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a
member of a committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarilyprudent person in alike position would exercise
under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation.
(b) In discharging his duties a director is entitled to rely on information, opinions,
reports, or statements, including financial statements and other financial data, if
prepared or presented by.
(1) one or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the director
reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the matters presented;
2001]
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These remaining thirty-two non-ULLCA-based state LLC statutes regulate the
fiduciary duties of managers in manager-managed LLCs and members (i.e.,
"managing members") in member-managed LLCs. Ofthese states, twentyparallel the
RMBCA and require managers and managing members to perform in good faith;5
(2) legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to matters the
director reasonably believes are within the person's professional or expert
competence; or
(3) a committee of the board of directors of which he is not a member if the
director reasonably believes the committee merits confidence.
(c) A director is not acting in good faith if he has knowledge concerning the
matter in question that makes reliance otherwise permitted by subsection (b)
unwarranted.
(d) A director is not liable for any action taken as a director, or any failure to take
any action, if he performed the duties of his office in compliance with this
section.
REVISED MODELBus. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1991).
Standards for Conduct of Officers
(a) An officer with discretionary authority shall discharge his duties under that
authority:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise
under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation.
(b) In discharging his duties an officer is entitled to rely on information, opinions,
reports, or statements, including financial statements and other financial data, if
prepared or presented by:
(1) one or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the officer
reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the matters presented;
(2) legal counsel, public accountants, or otherpersons as to matters the officer
reasonably believes are within the person's professional or expert competence.
(c) An officer is not acting in good faith if he has knowledge concerning the
matter in question that makes reliance otherwise permitted by subsection (b)
unwarranted.
(d) A officer is not liable for any action taken as an officer, or any failure to take
any action, if he performed the duties of his office in compliance with this
section.
Id. § 8.42.
51. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.135(a) (Michie 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-
406(1) (West 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-141(a) (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
608.4225(l)(a) (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-305(1) (1994 & Supp. 2000);
IOWACODEANN. § 490A.706(l) (West 1999); LA.REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1314(1) (West 1994
& Supp. 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 652(1) (West Supp. 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 450.4404(1) (West Supp. 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.69 (West 1995 & Supp.
2000); Miss. CODEANN. § 79-29-402(l)(a) (1999); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 347.088(1) (West Supp.
2000); N.Y. LTD. LLA. Co. LAW § 409(a) (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-22(b)
(West 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-96 (1995 & Supp. 1999); OHO REV. CODE ANN. §
1705.29(B) (Anderson 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2016(1) (West 1999); 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8943 (West 1995) (referring to id. § 1712(a)); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-17(a)
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twenty parallel the RMBCA and require managers and managing members to act
"with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under
similar circunstances;' n and nineteen parallel the RMBCA and require managers and
managing members to act "in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the company."'53 Eighteen of these states include in their statute something
approximating the RMBCA defense when the manager or managing member
reasonably relies on information supplied by others.' There are state variations with
(1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-241-111 (1995). Before they adopted the ULLCA, Hawaii,
Oregon, South Carolina, and Vermont were in this category.
52. REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)(2). Twenty state LLC acts apply some
variation of the ordinarily prudent person test to the actions of LLC managers and managing
members. These states also impose the good-faith standard. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.135(a)
(Michie 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-406(1) (West 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 34-141(a) (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4225(1)(c) (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE
ANN. § 14-11-305(1) (1994 & Supp. 2000); IOWACODEANN. § 490A.706(1) (West 1999); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1314(1) (West 1994 & Supp. 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §
652(1) (West 1996); MICH. COM. LAWS ANN. § 450.4404(1) (West Supp. 2000); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 322B.663 subd. I (West 1995 & Supp. 2000); Miss. CODEANN. § 79-29-402(1)(a)-(b)
(1999); Mo. REV. STAT. § 347.088(1) (1993); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 409(a) (McKinney
1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-22(b) (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-96 (1995 & Supp.
1999); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1705.29(B) (Anderson 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §
2016(1) (West 1999); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8943 (West 1995) (referring to id. §
1712(a)); I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-17(a) (1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-239-115(a) (1995).
Before adopting the ULLCA, Oregon and Vermont were in this category.
53. REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)(3). Nineteen state LLC acts require LLC
managers and managing members to perform with the belief that their actions are in the LLC's
best interests. These states also impose the good-faith and the due-care tests. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 10.50.135(a), (b) (Michie 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-406(1) (West 1999); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 34-141(a), (c) (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4225(1)(c), (4) (West Supp.
2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-305(1) (1994 & Supp. 2000); IOWA CODE ANN. §
490A.706(1), (3) (West 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1314(1)-(3) (West 1994 & Supp.
2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 652(1) (West 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
450.4404(1), (3) (West Supp. 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.663 subd. 1 (West 1995 &
Supp. 2000); MISS. CODEANN. § 79-29-402(1)(c) (1999); MO.ANN. STAT. § 347.088(1) (West
Supp. 2000);N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-22(b) (West 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-96 (1995
& Supp. 1997); OHIOREV. CODEANN. § 1705.29(B) (Anderson 1997); OKIA. STAT.ANN. tit.
18, § 2016(1) (West 1999); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8943 (West 1995) (referring to id. §
1712(a)); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-17(a) (1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-241-111 (1995). The
New York LLC act does not set forth a best-interests standard. See N.Y. LTD. LLAB. CO. LAW
§ 409 (McKinney 1999).
54. "SeeALASKA STAT. § 10.50.135 (Michie 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN..§ 7-80-406(2)
(West 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-141(b), (c) (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
608.4225(2), (4) (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-305(2), (3) (1994 & Supp.
2000); IOWACODE ANN. § 490A.706(2), (3) (West 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1314(2),
(3) (West 1994 & Supp. 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 652 (West 1996); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 450.4404(2), (3) (West Supp. 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.663 subd. 2(a),
2(b) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000); MIss. CODE ANN. § 79-29-402(2), (3) (1999); N.Y. LTD.
LIAB. Co. LAW § 32A-409(b) (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-22 (West 2000);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1705.29(C), (D) (Anderson 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §
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respect to the defense: Alaska adds a reasonable inquiry requirement,55 and Florida,
Minnesota, and Pennsylvania permit managers and managing members to consider
any factors that they deem relevant when discharging their duties.56
Eight states that address the issue of manager and managing-member fiduciary
duties without following the RMBCA model, use a duty-of-care approach and
provide immunity from liability absent gross negligence, willful misconduct, or the
violation of some other standard.' Four states are outliers. The California LLC act
2016(2), (3) (West 1999); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8943(b) (West 1995) (referring to id. §
1712(a), (b)); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-17(b), (c) (1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-241-111
(1995).
55. "A person who is a manager or a managing member ofa limited liability company shall
perform the duties of management... with the care, including reasonable inquiry, that an
ordinary prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances." ALASKA
STAT. § 10.50.135(a) (Michie 1998).
56. Florida's statute provides:
In discharging [his] duties, a manager or managing member may consider such
factors as [he] deems relevant, including the long-term prospects and interests of
the limited liability company and its members, and the social, economic, legal, or
other effects of any action on the employees, suppliers, customers of the limited
liability company, the communities and society in which the limited liability
company operates, and the economy of the state and the nation.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4225(3) (West Supp. 2000).
Minnesota's statute provides:
In discharging the duties of the position of governor, a governor may, in
considering the best interests of the limited liability company, consider the
interests of the limited liability company's employees, customers, suppliers, and
creditors, the economy of the state and nation, community and societal
considerations, and the long-term as well as the short-term interests of the limited
liability company and its members including the possibility that these interests
may be best served by the continued independence of the limited liability
company.
MNN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.663(5) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
Pennsylvania's statute provides:
In discharging the duties of their respective positions, [managers] may, in
consideringthe best interests ofthe corporation, consider the effects ofanyaction
upon employees, upon suppliers and customers of the corporation and upon
communities in which offices or other establishments of the corporation are
located, and all other pertinent factors.
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8943 (West 1995) (referring to id. § 1716(a)).
57. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-402(a) (Michie 1996) (gross negligence or willful
misconduct); IDAHO CODE § 53-622(1) (Michie 1994) (same); IND. CODE § 23-18-4-2(a)
(1998) (willful misconduct orrecklessness); KY.REv. STAT. ANN. § 275-170(1) (Michie Supp.
1998) (wanton or reckless misconduct); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:3 1 (IV) (1995) (gross
negligence or willful misconduct); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-26 (West Supp. 2000) (same);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1705.29(D) (Anderson 1997) (deliberate intent or reckless disregard);
WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.155(1) (West Supp. 2001) (gross negligence, intentional
misconduct, or a knowing violating of law); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 183.0402(1)(d) (West Supp.
1999) (wilful misconduct). In addition to its RMBCA-based standards, Ohio provides a
deliberate-intent or reckless-disregard standard.
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states that LLC managers have the same fiduciary duties as partners have to their
partnerships and their copartners." The Virginia LLC act provides that managers
shall act in their good faith business judgment of the LLC's best interests.59 The
Delaware LLC act states that the LLC agreement may provide for liability for
managers who fail to perform in accordance with the agreement, but otherwise
specifies no duties.' The Massachusetts LLC act recognizes that managers and
managing members may have duties at law or in equity but does not state them
affirmatively.6' Other states include provisions requiring managers to hold as trustees
profits from certain self-interested transactions62 and insulating managers acting in
good-faith reliance on the operating agreement from liability.63
Twenty-five states provide that the managers' and managing members' duties can
be modified by agreement of the parties.' The Maine LLC act expressly prohibits
modification of the managers' and managing members' duties."5 The remaining
58. CAL CORP. CODE § 17153 (West Supp. 2000).
59. VA. CODEANN. § 13.1024.1(A) (Michie 1999).
60. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-405 (1999).
61. MASS. ANN. LAwS ch. 156C, § 63(b) (Law. Co-op. 1996).
62. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-402(b) (Michie 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-
141(e) (West 1997); HAW. REV. STAT. § 428-409(b)(i) (Supp. 1999); IDAHO CODE § 53-622(2)
(Michie 1994); IND. CODE § 23-18-4-2 (1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.170 (Michie Supp.
1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1314A(5) (West 1994 & Supp. 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 31, § 652(2) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999); MICH. CoM. LAWS ANN. § 450.4404(5) (West
Supp. 2000); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.088(2) (West Supp. 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-
310(2)(a) (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:3 I(V)(b) (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-
16(D) (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-22(e) (1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 2016(5) (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.155(2) (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-
17(e) (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-402(A)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-240-102(a) (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 11, § 3059(b)(1) (1997); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 25.15.155(2) (West 1999); W. VA. CODEANN. § 3 1B-4-409(b)(1) (Michie 1996); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 183.0402(2) (West Supp. 2000).
63. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-141 (West 1993); DEL CODE ANN. it. 6, § 18-406
(1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-305(4)(B) (Supp. 1997); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156C, § 63
(Law. Co-op. 1996 & Supp. 2000); N.H.REv. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:35 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 42:2B-31 (West Supp. 2000).
64. See ARK. CoDEANN. § 4-32-404(a) (Michie 1996); CAL. CORP. CODE § 17005(b) (West
Supp. 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-108 (West 1999) (limited power to modify); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-143(1) (West 1997); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-405 (1999) (duties
exist byagreement); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4223 (WestSupp. 1997); GA. CODEANN. § 14-11-
305(4)(a) (1994 & Supp. 2000); IDAHO CODE § 53-624 (Michie 1994); IND. CODE § 23-18-4-
2(a) (1998); IOWACODEANN. § 490A.703(I) (West 1999); KY.REv. STAT. ANN. § 275-170(1)
(Michie Supp. 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1315 (West 1994); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
156C, §§ 8(b), 63(b) (Law. Co-op. 1996 & Supp. 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4407
(West Supp. 2000); MINN. STAT.ANN. § 322B. 115(4) (West 1995); MISs. CODEANN. § 79-29-
403 (1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.081 (West Supp. 2000); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304-
C:3 1(V) (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-26 (West Supp. 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-
07(4)(c) (1995 & Supp. 1999) (referring to id. § 10-32-71); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2017
(West 1999); R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-16-18 (1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-239-115(d) (1995);
VA. CODE § 13.1-1025 (1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 183.0402(3) (West Supp. 1999).
65. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31 § 652(3) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999).
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statutes are silent on modification.
The non-ULLCA-based state-statutory treatments of nonmanaging members also
are widely varied. Nine states have no statutory provisions regarding either manager
or member fiduciary duties.' Eighteen states address the fiduciary duties ofmanagers
and managing members, but not of nonmanaging members.' Six state statutes
provide that nonmanaging members have no fiduciary duties,68 while four statutes
provide that nonmanager members have no fiduciary duties unless such duties are
imposed under the operating agreement. 9 Three states charge nonmanager members
with the same fiduciary duties as managers."0 The Massachusetts LLC act recognizes
that nonmanaging members may have duties at law or in equity but does not state
them affirmatively.
7 1
2. State Information Right Enactments
As is the pattern with fiduciary duty provisions, non-ULLCA-based state LLC
statutes vary as to the information rights of nonmanager members. 2 Given the
66. The Arizona, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Utah and
Wyoming LLC acts make no reference to member or manager fiduciary duties.
67. California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Virginia, and Washington.
68. SeeARK. CODEANN. § 4-32-402(c) (Michie 1996); IDAHO CODE § 53-622(3) (Michie
1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-170(3) (Michie Supp. 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12:1314 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:3 I (V)(c) (1995); 15 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8943(b)(2) (West 1995).
69. SeeAI.ASKA STAT. § 10.50.130 (Michie 1998); GA. CODEANN. § 14-11-305(1) (1994
& Supp. 2000); IND. CODE § 23-18-4-2(c) (1998); Mo. REV. STAT. § 359-088 (West Supp.
2000).
70. See CONN.GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-141 (West 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 652
(West 1996 & Supp. 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 183.0402 (West Supp. 1999).
71. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156C, § 63(b) (Law. Co-op. 1996 & Supp. 2000).
72. It should be noted that the access of managers is not addressed in most state LLC
statutes. Similarly, managing members are not expressly given access rights beyond the access
rights they obtain as members. See ALA. CODE § 10-12-16(b) (1998); ALASKA STAT. §
10.50.870 (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-607(b) (West 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-
405 (Michie 1996); CAL. CORP. CODE § 17106 (West Supp. 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 7-80-411 (West 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-144 (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
608.4101 (West Supp. 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-313 (1994 & Supp. 2000); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 428-408 (Supp. 1999); IDAHO CODE § 53-625 (Michie 1994); 805 ILL COMP. STAT.
ANN. 180/10-15 (West Supp. 2000); IND. CODE § 23-18-4-8 (1998); IOWA CODE ANN. §
490A.709 (West 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56-1a205 (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-185
(Michie Supp. 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1319 (West 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS.
& Ass'NS § 4A-406 (1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156C, § 10 (Law. Co-op. 1996 & Supp.
2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4503 (West Supp. 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
322B.373 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000); MISS. CODEANN. § 79-29-308 (1999); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 347-091(2) (West 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-405(2) (West 2000); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 86.241 (1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-19 (Michie 1999); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW
§ 32A-1 102(b), (c) (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-04 (West 2000); N.D. CENT.
[Vol. 76:271
LIMITED LIABILITY FIRMS
breadth of state fiduciary duty rules, it is somewhat surprising that there is even less
consistency in the state information access and disclosure rules. Thirty non-ULLCA-
based state LLC statutes require that the LLC keep some identified classes of
records." These LLC statutes follow the lead of the RMBCA and the RULPA, under
which certain classes of records are required to be kept,74 and not the example of the
UPA and the RUPA (and the ULLCA), under which no records are required to be
kept.75 However, six states permit broader contract freedom and require that
prescribed records shall be maintained unless otherwise provided in the LLC's
articles of organization or operating agreement.76 Further, four non-ULLCA-based
state LLC statutes do not require that any records be kept and do not specify record
access rules.' Seven state LLC statutes do not affirmatively state that records must
be retained, but instead provide that members shall have access to certain records,
CODE § 10-32-51 (1995 & Supp. 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1705.22 (Anderson 1997);
OL, REV. STAT. § 70.050(2) (1999); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8525 (West 1995); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 7-16-22(b) (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-405 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 47-34-11 (Michie 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-228-101 to -102 (1995);
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 2.22(E) (Vernon 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2B-
119(2) (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3058 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1028(B) (1999);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31B-4-408 (Michie 1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 183.0405 (West Supp.
1999). Six states do specifically provide for manager access to information, typically granting
full access to information required to be maintained for purposes reasonably related to their
managerial positions. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-305(b) (1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 31, § 655(2)(B) (West 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:28(l), (II) (1995); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 42:2B-25 (West Supp. 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2021(C) (West 1999);
WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.135(3) (West Supp. 2000).
73. SeeALA. CODE § 10-12-16(a) (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-607(a) (West 1998);
CAL. CORP. CODE § 17058 (West Supp. 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-411 (West
1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-144 (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4101(1) (West
Supp. 2000); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-35 (West Supp. 2000); IND. CODE § 23-18-4-
8(a) (1998); IOWACODE ANN. § 490A.709(1) (West 1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-185(1)
(Michie Supp. 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1319(A) (West 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 31, § 655(1) (West 1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156C, § 9(a) (Law. Co-op. 1996 & Supp
2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4213 (West Supp. 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
322B.373(1) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-29-107(1) (1999); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 347.091(1) (West 2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.241(1) (Michie 1999); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 53-19-19 (Michie 1999); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 32A-1 102(a) (McKinney
1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-51(1) (1995 & Supp. 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-22(1)
(1999); S.C. CODEANN. § 33-43-405(A) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1999); S.D. CODIFMDLAWS §47-
34-11 (Michie 2000); TEN. CODE ANN. § 48-228-101 to -102 (1995); TEX. REV. STAT. ANN.
art. 1528n, § 2.22(A) (Vernon 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-1 19(1) (1998); VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-1028(A) (1999); WASH. REV. CODEANN. § 25.15.135(1) (West Supp. 2000); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 183.0405(1) (West Supp. 1999).
74. REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 16.01 (1996); REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT §
105(a) (amended 1997), 6A U.L.A. 88-89 (1995).
75. REVISED UNIF. P'sHP ACT § 403 cmt. 1 (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 56 (Supp. 2000).
76. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.860 (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-405 (Michie
1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-313 (1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-625(1) (Michie 1994); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 35-8-405(1) (1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2021(A) (West 1999).
77. Kansas, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming.
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such as tax returns, member and manager names and addresses, operating agreements
and articles of organization, and information concerning member capital
contributions. 8
The records required to be maintained under the state LLC statutes often include
a copy of the LLC's articles of organization and operating agreement, lists of
members and managers, tax returns, financial statements, information on capital
contributions and the members' rights to distributions, and the like. Some statutes use
phrases such as "books and records ofaccount."79 Access to these core records varies,
but in general members have relatively easy access to core materials.80 One state
places no requirements or restrictions on members' rights to inspect records required
to be maintained. Twenty-five states place minimal time and place restrictions on
the members' inspection rights; typically these limit the members' inspection rights
to normal business hours at the LLC's principal place of business. 2 Moving up the
scale, twelve states require a written request, 3 thirteen states impose aproperpurpose
78. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-305(a) (1999); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. &Ass'Ns §
4A-406(a) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:28(I) (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §42:2B-25(a)
(West Supp. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-04(a) (2000); OHo REy. CODE ANN. §
1705.22(A)(1) (West 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3058 (1997).
79. E.g., ALA. CODE § 10-12-16(b) (1999).
80. "Those records, and any other books and records of the limited liability company,
wherever situated, are subject to inspection and copying for any other purpose at the reasonable
request, and at the expense of, any member or the member's agent or attorney during regular
business hours." ALA. CODE § 10-12-16(b) (1999). "A limited liability company shall make
its books and records of account, or certified copies of them, reasonably available for
inspection and copying at its registered office or principal office in the state by a member of
the company." ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.870(a) (1998).
81. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-607 (West Supp. 1998).
82. See ALA. CODE § 10-12-16(b) (1999); ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.870 (1998); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-32-405 (Michie Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-411 (West 1999);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-144(a) (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4101(2) (West Supp.
2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-313 (1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-625(1) (Michie 1994); 805 ILL
COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/10-15 (West Supp. 2000); IND. CODE § 23-18-4-8 (1998); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 275-185(2) (Michie Supp. 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1319(B) (West
1994); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156C, § 9(b) (Law. Co-op. 1996); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. §
450.4503(2) (West Supp. 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.373 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-29-107(2) (1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.091(2) (West Supp. 2000);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 86.241(2) (Michie 1999); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:28(VI)
(1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-51(2) (Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2021(B)
(1999); RIA. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-22(b) (1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-228-102(a) (1994);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.135(2) (West Supp. 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 183.0405(2)
(West Supp. 1999).
83. SeeAASKA STAT. § 10.50.870 (1998); DEL CODEANN. tit. 6, § 18-305(e) (1999); KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 275-185(2) (Michie Supp. 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 655(2)
(West 1996); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-406(a) (1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 450.4503(2) (West Supp. 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.373 (West 1995 & Supp.
2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:28(V) (1995); N.J. STAT.ANN. § 42:2B-25 (West Supp.
2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-04(c) (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-51(2) (Supp. 1997);




requirement," twenty-eight states require a "reasonable request" for the inspection, 5
and six states allow further restrictions on access by agreement8 6 Four states permit
access to core information to be restricted to maintain confidentiality." One state
prevents member use of disclosed core information."
Twelve non-ULLCA-based statutes provide that members have identical
access to core and noncore records. 9 Five non-ULLCA-based statutes do not provide
for member access to any information beyond the core records.' Four non-ULLCA-
based state LLC statutes do not provide any record access rules.9' Michigan permits
84. SeeALA. CODE § 10-12-16(b) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.870 (1998); CAL CORP.
CODE § 17106(a) (West Supp. 2000); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-305(a) (1999); 805 ILL
COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/10-15 (Supp. 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 655(2) (West
1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.373(2)(b) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000) (noncore records);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:28(U) (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-25(a) (West Supp.
2000); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 32A-1 102(b) (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-
04(a) (2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1705.22(A) (1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §
2021(B) (1999).
85. See ALA. CODE § 10-12-16(b) (1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-405 (Michie 1996);
CAL. CORP. CODE § 17106(b) (West Supp. 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-411 (West
1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 34-144(c) (West 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-305(a)
(1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4101(3) (West Supp. 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-313
(1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-625(2) (Michie 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.709(2) (West
1999); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 275-185(2) (Michie Supp. 1998); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
12:1319(B) (2000); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 655(2) (West 1996); MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-406(a) (1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156C, § 9(b) (Law. Co-op.
1996); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4503(2) (West Supp. 2000); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
347.091(2) (West Supp. 2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.241(2) (Michie 1999); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 304-C:28(I) (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-25(a) (West Supp. 2000); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-04(a) (2000); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1705.22(A) (1997); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 2021 (B) (1999); RI. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-22(b) (1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-
2b-119 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1028(B) (Michie 1999); WASH. REV. CODE §
25.15.135(2) (West Supp. 2000); WLS. STAT. ANN. § 183.0405(2) (West Supp. 1999).
86. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1319(B) (West 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §
655(2) (West 1996); N.Y. LTD. LiAB. Co. LAW § 32A-1 102(c) (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 57C-3-04(a) (2000); OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 1705.22(A) (1997); VA. CODE ANN. §
13.1-1028(A) (Michie 1999).
87. SeeDELCODEANN. tit. 6, § 18-305(e) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:28(III)
(1995); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 32A-1 102(c) (McKinne 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1705.22(B) (1997).
88. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-51(5) (Supp. 1997).
89. SeeALA. CODE § 10-12-16(b) (1999); ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.870 (1998); ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 29-607(B) (West Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 34-144(d) (West 1997);
GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-313 (1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-625(2) (Michie 1994); 805 ILL COMP.
STAT. ANN. 180/10-15 (Supp. 2000); IND. CODE § 23-18-4-8(b) (1998); KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 275-185(2) (Michie Supp. 1998); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:1319(A) (West 1992); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2021(3) (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-405(B) (West Supp. 1999).
90. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4101 (West Supp. 2000); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 86.241
(Michie 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-228-102 (1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-1 19
(1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.135 (West Supp. 2000).
91. Kansas, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming.
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access to noncore books and records to the extent just and reasonable;' Minnesota
permits access to noncore records if a proper purpose is shown;93 North Dakota
permits persons who have been members for six months to obtain noncore records
upon a showing of proper purpose;94 and Oklahoma permits access to any noncore
record unless otherwise provided in the operating agreement.95 California has unique
and complex disclosure rules.'
In addition to the record access rules, twenty-seven states require disclosure of
information concerning the LLC's business and financial affairs and of other
information to the extent just and reasonable.9 However, there are various
permutations of these statutes. One state requires showing a proper purpose related
to the members' interest;9" one state requires a reasonable purpose;" four states limit
the information disclosure to things affecting the members' interests; ° one state
limits the information disclosure requirement to "information required to be
documented or filed by law"; °' one state requires information disclosure "where
circumstances allow"; 0 2 three states require member demand or request;'°3 five states
require reasonable demand or request;" 4 and one state makes the information
92. MICH. CoM. LAWS ANN. § 450.4503(3) (West Supp. 2000).
93. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.373(2) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
94. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-51(3) (Supp. 1997).
95. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2021(A) (1999).
96. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 17106(c) (West Supp. 2000).
97. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.870 (1998); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-607(B) (West
Supp. 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-405 (Michie 1996); DEL CODEANN. tit. 6, § 18-305(a)
(1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-313 (1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-625(3)(Michie 1994); IND.
CODE § 23-18-4-8(c) (1998); IOWA CODEANN. § 490A.709(2) (West 1999); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 275-185(3) (Michie Supp. 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1319(B) (West2000); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 655(2) (West 1996); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. &ASs'NS § 4A-406(a)
(1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156C, § 10 (Law. Co-op. 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
450.4503(4) (West Supp. 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-29-308(1) (1996); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 347.091(2) (West Supp. 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:28(I) (1995); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 42:2B-25(a) (West Supp. 2000); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 32A-1 102(b) (McKinney
1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-04(a) (2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1705.22(A) (1997);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2021(B) (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-22(a) (1999); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 33-43-405(C) (West Supp. 1999); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 2.22(D)
(Vernon 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1028(B) (Michie 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
183.0405(3) (West Supp. 1999).
98. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-607(B) (West Supp. 1998).
99. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-29-308(1) (1996).
100. See IND. CODE § 23-18-4-8(c) (1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-185(3) (Michie
Supp. 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-405(C) (West Supp. 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
183.0405(3) (West Supp. 1999).
101. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:28() (1995).
102. IND. CODE § 23-18-4-8(c) (1998).
103. See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-313 (1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.709(2) (West
1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4503(3) (West Supp. 2000).
104. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-29-308(1) (1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.091(2) (West
Supp. 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2021(B) (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-405(B)
(West Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1028(B) (Michie 1999).
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disclosure "subject to reasonable standards."' 5 Several states allow management to
withhold information at least for a limited period of time based on the reasonable
belief that nonmanager member access to such records might harm the company or
when the information is confidential."°6 Two states permit the LLC to apply for a
protective order to prevent disclosure of confidential information to members."
C. A Need for Consistency
Some commentators argued against the need for any top-down consensus when
drafting business-organization statutes, and have claimed that overtime the state LLC
statutes will evolve toward uniformity, at least when such uniformity is efficient.'
This approach begs several questions. First, it can be argued that economic efficiency
is not the single appropriate method for judging statutes and that, for example,
common information disclosure and fiduciary duty rules serve the valuable social
goal of encouraging truthtelling and the development of trust.'" As discussed below,
unincorporated business law historically has not been driven by the view that
participants are autonomous wealth maximizers, but instead has recognized certain
communitarian aspects of business organizations. Second, a nonuniform approach,
which casts the various state legislatures in the role of experimental laboratories for
developing effective statutes, assumes that the drafters will use some theoretical
analysis in drafting a state-specific statute. If the state legislatures do notact fromany
foundation, but instead use ad hoc adaptations from other forms, the laboratory
analogy does not fit since there is no experimentation. Third, even if the laboratory
analogy initially were to fit and different states followed their own valid logic in
105. MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-29-308(1) (1996).
106. Seven states allow restrictions on access to noncore materials when management feels
access might harm the LLC. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-305(c) (1999); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 31, § 655(2) (West 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:28(III) (1995); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 42:2B-25 (West Supp. 2000); N.Y. LTD. LLAB. Co. LAW § 32A-1 102(c) (McKinney
1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-04(e) (2000); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1705.22(B) (1997).
107. See MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.373(3) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 10-32-51(4) (Supp. 1997).
108. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Evolution and Spontaneous Uniformity:
Evidence from the Evolution of the Limited Liability Company, 34 EcoN. INQUIRY 464, 468
(1996); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Uniform Laws, Model Laws and Limited
Liability Companies, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 947, 951 (1995). In a recent article, Professor
Ribstein states:
[U]niform laws reduce innovation and experimentation .... No set ofprovisions
can meet perfectly all the applicable criteria at any given time, much less
for a significant amount of time in a rapidly changing world.... By contrast,
competition among the states would continue testing and refining state law. The
collective wisdom of fifty-one legislatures, spurred by lawyers and business
people all motivated to achieve the right result, is far greater than that of
NCCUSL. As Hayek observed, "if left free, men will often achieve more than
individual human reason could design or foresee."
Ribstein, supra note 3, at 964-65 (citations omitted).
109. See Allan W. Vestal, "Assume a Rather Large Boat... ": The Mess We Have Made
of Partnership Law, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487, 523-24 (1997).
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adopting statutes, one would expect changes as the states tested and refined their
laws. In fact; other than in states that have adopted the ULLCA, the individual state
information disclosure and fiduciary duty rules have remained stable over time even
though many states have amended their LLC statutes to address other concerns.
Fourth, there are costs associated with nonuniformity, including the balkanization of
state laws from a national economic community to a collection of separate states and
the confusion that stems from applying different rules to otherwise similar business
organizations.' Uniformity assists in developing abody of generally understood and
applied law, reduces search costs and uncertainty in searching for an ideal state
statute, and eliminates the ability for participants to seek advantage through choice
of law. Finally, when accomplished well, uniform laws permit those who know the
nuances of the legal regime in question to discuss the values of different approaches,
to reach conclusions concerning how the regime should work, and to craft a uniform
act in accordance with those conclusions.
In our view, the benefits of uniform state business-association laws likely outweigh
the benefits of evolutionary statutory development and participant flexibility in
choosing an optimal statute. One disadvantage of uniformity is the amplification of
bad-drafting choices, and it is incumbent on uniform-law drafters to promulgate well-
designed and theoretically appropriate uniform acts. Unfortunately, the NCCUSL did
not meet this standard when it promulgated the ULLCA.
III. A DIsCLosuURE THEORY FOR UNINCORPORATED
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
If we wish to improve on the ULLCA information provisions-which without
apparent justification treat nonmanager members as partners for information receipt
purposes and as noncontrolling shareholders for information use purposes-then it
would be helpful to proceed from a clearly articulated theory of how information
rights and use provisions should be structured. Three approaches show some promise:
party autonomy, conimunitarianism, and structuralism.
Unincorporated business organizations, through which autonomous persons
associate in a limited community to carry on business for mutual advantage, are
inherently tense."' For example, a partnership is an "association of two or more
110. Keatinge, supra note 1.
I 1l. Robert Keatinge also recognizes this tension:
Many aspects of associations are apparently contradictory, or at best, ambiguous.
On one hand, a partnership has been characterized as no more of an entity than
a friendship. On the other, an association is at once a contract among its owners
and a separate entity with its own legal identity. The owners are at once self-
interested and fiduciaries to the other owners and the association.
Robert R. Keatinge, The Implications of Fiduciary Relationships in Representing Limited
Liability Companies and Other UnincorporatedAssociations and Their Partners orMembers,
25 STETsON L. REv. 389, 389-90 (1995) (citations omitted).
This recognition of the tension between autonomy and community reflects conflict about
the nature of humanity and society and has long been the focus of political philosophers. For
example, the starting point for Thomas Hobbes's system was the concrete individual
completely isolated from his social context, and Hobbes asserted that it was completely natural
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persons to carry on a business as co-owners for profit."' 2 As an association a
partnership is a collective organization, a business community. This collective aspect
is evidenced by the fact that, unless the partnership agreement provides otherwise,
partners share equally in partnership profits and losses,"' partners have equal
management rights,"4 partners have equal agency authorityto act on thepartnership's
behalf,"5 and (except in the case of limited liability partnerships) partners have joint,
or joint and several, personal responsibility for partnership debts, obligations, and
liabilities." 6 This collective aspect of partnerships also provides the foundation for
partner fiduciary duties with respect to the partnership and among partners."
7
At the same time, a partnership is an association of autonomous persons, each of
whom has the independent legal capacity to contract, to own property, and otherwise
to pursue their own interests. Furthermore, the association conceives of partners as
autonomous, individuals who exist prior to the collective, and it is only through
voluntary association that partners enter into community. Having agreed to associate,
the question becomes the extent to which partners thereby surrender their autonomy
in favor of reciprocity, and with such surrender their right to hold property and to
pursue their personal interests apart from the partnership and their copartners."1'
Partners, particularlypartners in more complexpartnerships, frequentlyhavebusiness
activities outside the partnership and may possess information and skills from their
other activities that are relevant to the partnership and their copartners. For example,
a partner in a computer software development partnership may also be engaged in the
for man to be alone rather than in "sociable communion" with his fellows. See THOMAS
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 1950) (1651). Thus, to Hobbes all forms of
community were artificial rather than natural in origin, and society was simply the result of a
voluntary compact between individuals motivated by a desire for self-preservation. Even this
social life is marked by distrust and mutual hostility, and it was anticipated that the sovereign
would operate in a limited realm in order to leave each individual the maximum of liberty to
pursue his personal goals.
Although Jean Jacques Rousseau's starting point was individualist, he emphasized the
superiority of social life, through the sovereign general will, over the state of nature. In
Rousseau's view, in society man loses his natural liberty, but-obtains civil liberty. Man also
obtains a right of property, guaranteed by the law, instead of a more precarious possession
which is dependent on his own strength. Rousseau stresses the benefit of a social life, and not
the need to attempt to preserve in society the values of a state of nature. Rousseau can be
viewed as a precursor to a collectivist attitude toward man's place in society rather than as a
proponent of individual liberty. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (George
Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1948) (1895); see also J.W. GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 164-74
(1957).
112. REVISED UNIF. P'SW ACT § 202 (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 27 (Supp. 2000).
113. Id. § 401(b), 6 U.L.A. 52.
114. Id. § 401(o.
115. Id. § 301(1), 6 U.L.A. 33.
116. Id. § 306(a), 6 U.L.A. 45.
117. Id. § 404(a), 6 U.L.A. 58.
118. For discussions of the moral foundations of contract law, stressing ideals of autonomy
and reciprocity, see P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979);
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE
LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1998) (post-Rawlsian discussion of individualism and community).
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software development business for its own account or in otherpartnerships with other
partners. It is unlikely that such a partner would seek completely to surrender its
autonomy (including the right to maintain as proprietary information developed
outside the partnership) upon entry into partnership, particularly when copartners
might compete and thereby threaten its independent existence. On the other hand, the
ideal of reciprocity derives contractual obligation from the mutual benefits of
cooperative arrangements, and implies an independent principle by which the fairness
of an exchange can be assessed.
The legal system has wrestled with questions involving the extent to which
independent persons surrender autonomy when they enter into the business
community, and disclosure obligation and fiduciary duty rules are implicated in this
engagement." '9 Business organization law can be viewed, at least in part, as a set of
rules mediating autonomy and community. We conclude that the nature and extent of
disclosure and fiduciary obligations are best determined by locating particular
business organizations (and the individual participants in those organizations) on an
autonomy-community continuum. We also conclude that certain rules have changed
as the law's approach to unincorporated business organizations has changed from a
conception-albeit one never absolute except in the associated rhetoric-that
participants surrender their autonomy in favor of community, to a more nuanced
conception that participants can retain at least some aspects of their autonomy while
participating in a business conimunity.'2 ° Similarly, we conclude that the autonomy-
community concept must be considered when drafting disclosure and fiduciary duty
rules and that statutes, such as the ULLCA, which fail to develop or implement an
appropriate business organization theory are flawed and dangerous. Fortunately
legislative drafting is an evolutionary process, and the recognition of both flaws and
alternative models can assist drafters to create better statutes over time.
A. The Autonomy Model and the Case for Nondisclosure
One approach to unincorporated business organization information rights and use
restrictions would conceive of the associating parties as atomistic contracting agents
engaged in individual wealth-maximizing behavior with constant recalculation of
individual advantage.' The core distinction between this model and others is in the
119. There has been a lively debate over the nature of partnerships, particularly in
connection with the RUPA's fiduciary duty rules. See generally 1. Dennis Hynes, Fiduciary
Duties and RUPA: An Inquiry into Freedom of Contract, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 29
(1995) (arguing for contract-based formulation with wide latitude for participant-negotiated
provisions); Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Not Ready for Prime
Time, 49 Bus. LAw. 45 (1993) (providing critical analysis ofRUPA restrictions on participant-
negotiated provisions); Vestal, supra note 21 (arguing for traditional fiduciary-based
conceptualization). For a summary of this debate, see generally Callison, supra note 19.
120. This change may track other social trends. See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT
DISRUPTION: HUMAN NATURE AND THE RECONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL ORDER (1999); see also
Thomas E. Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and Coevolution: The Web ofLaw, Management Theory,
and Law Related Services at the Millennium (pts. 1 & 2), 65 TENN. L. REV. 925 (1998), 66
TENN. L. REv. 137 (1998).
121. The theoretical roots of this approach can be found in the law and economics
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instantaneously recalculating nature of the individual wealth-maximizing behavior.
Presumably all members of business firms seek individual wealth maximization, and
the central distinction between rival conceptions of the firm is the extent to which
members are required to subordinate immediate individual advantage in order to
maximize long-term collective-wealth gains." The autonomy model couples a
distinction between the interests of the individual and those of others with a belief
that preference for individual interests is legitimate.
Of course, there may be situations in which it is in the collective best interests of
the participants to limit the individual participants' ability to recalculate and
immediatelypursue their individual advantage. This raises the second core distinction
ofthe autonomymodel, the virtually unrestricted ability of the participants to arrange
their relationship through contractual agreements inter se.lu
Consider a situation where four individuals form a partnership. At year one any of
the four could dissolve the partnership and receive sixteen dollars, with the other
partners each receiving ten dollars. But if none of the partners abandon, then at year
two each would receive fifteen dollars. Abandonment at year one generates an
aggregate return of forty-six dollars; completion of year two generates an aggregate
return of sixty dollars. The autonomy model, which approves instantaneous
recalculation of individual wealth-maximizing behavior, tends in the absence of ex
ante restrictions toward the first outcome and forfeits fourteen dollars in aggregate
return. With appropriate contractual restrictions, partners can eliminate the possibility
of early termination and realize the highest aggregate return.
How would the autonomy model deal with the disclosure of information within an
unincorporated firm? The best analogy is the treatment afforded parties engaged in
arm's-length commercial negotiations. Courts have frequently considered the extent
to which contracting parties must share information with one another. Unlike
fiduciaries, parties dealing at am's length are not frequently compelled to disclose
material facts to one another, nor are they required to share their opinions and
analyses concerning a transaction's merits with one another.'24 Thus the law neither
movement:
Following the basic precepts ofwelfare economics, Law and Economics scholars
see atornistic contracting agents engaging in maximizing behavior that generally
has no impact on third parties. In so doing, the parties are generally expected to
reach socially optimal "contractual" arrangements with one another. Each set of
contracting parties has maximized its joint wealth, and hence the aggregate value
of all contracts cannot be increased.
Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, andNetworks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV.
757, 758 (1995). Corporate norms presuppose that the shareholder relationship is an
autonomous one, and shareholders are not assumed to represent each other as agents. Thus,
shareholders generally owe no duties, at least in the absence of a controlling shareholder who
exercises control over the corporation. Id. at 767.
122. See Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering Within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAI L. REV.
425,465 (1987).
123. See J. Dennis Hynes, Freedom of Contract, Fiduciary Principles, and Partnerships:
The Bargain Principle and the Law ofAgency, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 439,452-53 (1997).
124. See AnthonyT. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, andtheLawofContracts,
7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9-32 (1978).
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encourages contracting parties to trust one another nor assumes that they do so.
Instead, in this individualist model, each party is entitled to retain the advantages he
or she enjoys, and each party's duties are those that are expressly contracted for.
However, in some cases, parties have been held legally responsible for their failure
to disclose material information. Although legal scholars have proffered various
theories to distinguish circumstances in which disclosure is required from those in
which it is not, 25 it is necessary for this discussion to note only that courts do not
generally mandate disclosure when parties transact business on an arm' s-lengthbasis.
To the extent members of unincorporated business organizations are treated as
mutually disinterested and autonomous contracting parties, in the absence of ex ante
contractual provisions mandating information disclosure such parties should be able
to withhold information from one another to the same extent that parties are able to
withhold information during contract negotiations.
In an article applying economic-analysis principles to contract disclosure
obligations, Dean Anthony Kronman addresses the question of when "the possessor
of... information [has] the right to deal with others without disclosing what he
knows."'26 Instead of examining the relationship between the contracting parties,
Kronman considers whether disclosure is wealth maximizing. He begins by asserting
that a disclosure requirement should be presumed because greater information makes
it more likely that goods will flow to those persons who most value them. 27 However,
Kronman also recognizes that information production is itself a social good and that
broad and strict disclosure requirements can create socially undesirable disincentives
to information production. He concludes that the legal privilege not to disclose
valuable information is a property right, and that courts should permit a contracting
party to withhold material information when the information is the product of the
party's deliberate effort:
125. See, e.g., KIM L. SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALrrY AND EFFIENcY IN THE
COMMON LAw (1988); Kronman, supra note 124; Andrew Kull, Unilateral Mistake: The
Baseball Card Case, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 57 (1992); Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets:
Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REv. 117 (1982); Edward H. Rabin, A
Proposed Black-Letter Rule Concerning Mistaken Assumptions in Bargain Transactions, 45
TEx. L. REV. 1273 (1967); Alan Strudler, Moral Complexity in the Law ofNondisclosure, 45
UCLA L. REv. 337 (1997); Christopher T. Wonnell, The Structure of a General Theory of
Nondisclosure, 41 CASE W. RES. L. RE v. 329 (1991). Professor Deborah DeMott surveyed the
scene and concluded that "legal doctrine does not resolve these [disclosure] scenarios in a
symmetrical fashion" and that scholarly efforts to isolate a single unifying theme in the
disclosure cases or to state a general doctrine that would rationalize their outcomes are doomed
to fail. Deborah A. DeMott, Do You Have the Right to Remain Silent?: Duties of Disclosure
in Business Transactions, 19 DEL J. CORP. L. 65, 66-67 (1994).
126. Kronman, supra note 124, at 33. Although Kronman has become more critical of the
legal-economics model, see Anthony T. Kronman, The Fault in Legal Ethics, 100 DIcK. L.
REv. 489 (1996), his 1978 article is rooted in economic analysis. The article asserts this
analysis not because it believes it to be correct in all accounts, but because it best illustrates the
case for nondisclosure among autonomous persons. Id. at 17. Several scholars specifically
criticize Kronman's analysis. See, e.g., SCHEPPELE, supra note 125, at 31-35; Demott, supra
note 125, at 68-69; Strudler, supra note 125, at 349-63.
127. Kronman, supra note 124, at 13 ("Allocative efficiency is promoted by getting
information of changed circumstances to the market as quickly as possible.").
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Where nondisclosure is permitted .... the knowledge involved is typically the
product of a costly search. A rule permitting nondisclosure is the only effective
way ofproviding an incentive to invest in the production of such knowledge. By
contrast, in the cases requiring disclosure... the knowledgeable party's special
information is typically not the fruit of a deliberate search. Although information
of this sort is socially useful as well, a disclosure requirement will not cause a
sharp reduction in the amount of such information which is actually produced.'
If this individualist model were to be used in a partnership setting, PartnerA would
not be required to disclose valuable information to Partner B if the information were
the product of A's efforts to produce the information.'29 For example, if Partner A
expended resources to obtain information concerning oil and gas deposits in the area
surrounding partnership property, he would not be required to disclose such
information to Partner B when negotiating to acquire partnership property or when
negotiating to acquire B's partnership interest.30 Similarly, Partner A would not be
required to disclose the information to Partner B, and Partner B would not have the
right to demand disclosure, even when the information is significant to the
partnership's business activities.
Even if Dean Kronman's analysis describes the results of certain contract cases, it
does not describe the result in most partnership cases.' 3 ' In fact, Kronman recognizes
that the principles supporting nondisclosure might not apply when "the nature of the
transaction or the relation of the parties [is] such that as to the particular transaction
in question, the duties of a fiduciary are imposed upon one or the other party, and
such a relation involves a duty of disclosure."'3 Instead, unless the parties contract
for nondisclosure, partnership law historically has mandated information disclosure
in the negotiations leading to partnership formation, during the partnership's life, and
when one partner seeks to acquire the interest of another partner (or to sell its interest
to another partner).,' Furthermore, partnership law historicallyhas compelledpartner
disclosure of information material to partnership management decisions and has
recognized that partners have the right to demand broad disclosure of "things
affecting the partnership."'" The partnership cases do not turn on the question of
whether the information is or generally would be the product of a partner's deliberate
128. Id. at 9 (emphasis added). Kronman actually goes a step further. He states that "It]he
cost of administering a disclosure requirement on a case-by-case basis is likely to be
substantial" and recommends a blanket rule for particular classes of cases based on "whether
the kind of information involved is (on the whole) more likely to be generated by chance or
by deliberate searching." Id. at 17-18.
129. Or, in Kronman's view, A would have no duty to disclose if A's information were of
a type that normally is produced by a deliberate search. See id. at 17-18.
130. See, e.g., Peckham v. Johnson, 98 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (reliance of
partner on copartner to disclose all material facts concerning value of partnership property).
131. However, it probably does describe the position of persons negotiating to become
partners under RUPA. See Callison, supra note 19, at 124-33; Vestal, supra note 21, at 556
(both articles criticize RUPA's elimination of preformation fiduciary duties, including the
disclosure duty).
132. Kronman, supra note 124, at 18'n.49.
133. See infra note 139.
134. UNriF. P'sHn ACT § 20, 6 U.L.A. 602 (1995).
2001]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
efforts but instead focus on the nature of partnership and the relationship among
partners.
If disclosure is the rule rather than the exception in the partnership setting, the
question concerns what it is about partnerships that typically mandates disclosure
rather than permits secrecy. Answering that question is critical in determining
whether changes in legal relationships over the last decade have changed the
foundations on which the partnership disclosure rules were established and, if so,
whether and the extent to which disclosure rules should also change.
. The Community Model and the Case for Full Disclosure
A second approach to unincorporated business organization information rights and
use restrictions would conceive of the associating parties as members of a community
who are engaged in individual wealth-maximizingbehaviorwith temporallyrestricted
recalculation of individual advantage. Again, one core distinction is in the
recalculation of individual advantage. Under this approach, the parties are viewed
(even in the absence of any explicit statements) as agreeing ex ante to refrain from
the recalculation of individual advantage during certain periods of the firm's
existence. Here the firm's members subordinate immediate advantage in order to
maximize long-term collective-wealth gains."3 5
The community model views the participants not simply as autonomous wealth-
maximizing individuals banding together for transitory advantage, but rather as
members of a community pursuing collective goals. In this view, even in the absence
of express contractual provisions mandating individual sharing or sacrifice,
individuals should not be permitted unduly to prefer their interests over the interests
of others. Once the collective identity is realized, it becomes possible to consider the
existence of duties to the collective and to the other members. 36 Further, once the
enterprise is viewed as having an internal social dynamic, it also becomes possible
to consider the enterprise as having an external social identity that admits the
consideration of obligations flowing outside the enterprise; including obligations to
society as a whole. This approach builds on the view that contractual relations create
ties of community between the parties, and that such ties create moral imperatives
beyond the duties expressly assumed by the parties.
137
135. Consider again the situation discussed above in which four individuals form a
partnership. At the end of year one, any of the four can dissolve the partnership and receive
sixteen dollars, with the other partners each receiving ten dollars. But if none of the partners
dissolve, then at year two each partner receives fifteen dollars. The community model, which
abandons instantaneous, recalculating individual wealth-maximizing behavior, establishes rules
requirifig consideration of group gains and thus tends toward the second outcome with the
realization of an additional fourteen dollars in aggregate return over the party autonomy model.
136. See, e.g., Vestal, supra note 19,at 1127-33 (arguingthat acollective-benefittestshould
be applied to law-partner expulsions); see also Callison, supra note 19, at 148-53 (collective
benefit approach applied to good-faith duty).
137. See, e.g., ATIYAH, supra note 118, at 716-37. Professor Duncan Kennedy contrasts
individualism with altruism and proposes that altruism is the appropriate morality for
contractual relationships. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARv. L.REv. 1685, 1733-35 (1976). In this view, altruism is a morality of
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Under this construction, there should be broad disclosure rights in contract-based
business communities such thatpartners cannot obtainpersonalbenefit atthe expense
of either the collective interests of the partnership or the interests of their copartners.
In addition, under the communitarian approach, partners would have broad fiduciary
duties, and each partner would have stringent limitations on the personal use of
partnership information. Partnership law historically has adopted a communitarian
approach to partner information rights and disclosure obligations, both in the Uniform
Partnership Act ("UPA") 138 and through the common law of partner fiduciary
duties.13  This approach also has limited how partners can use disclosed
sharing and individual sacrifice. Id. at 1726.
138. Partner disclosure obligations under the UPA can be divided into two broad categories:
routine disclosure obligations and nonroutine disclosure obligations. The routine disclosure
requirements are not expressly contained in the UPA, but areimplied from UPA section 18(e)'s
pronouncement that "[a]ll partners have equal rights in the management and conduct of the
partnership business." UNEF. P'sHir ACT § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. 526. When all partners participate
equally in partnership management, it is appropriate to imply a requirement that all partners
have equal rights to receive, without demand, that information which is required for them to
participate meaningfully in management.
The UPA expressly sets forth several nonroutine requirements which operate beyond the
implied routine disclosure obligation. These disclosure requirements "are extraordinarybecause
they are not intended to be invoked" in the partnership's ordinary operations, and they are
remedial because they seek to "assure access to information when normal patterns of
information dissemination have broken down" or are ineffective. Allan W. Vestal, "AskMe No
Questions and I'll Tell You No Lies ". Statutory and Common-Law Disclosure Requirements
Within High-Tech Joint Ventures, 65 TUL L. REV. 705, 717 (1991). First, UPA section 20
states that "[p]artners shall render on demand true and full informatioh of all things affecting
the partnership to any partner or the legal representative of any deceased partner or partner
under legal disability." UNEF. P's-mAcT § 20,6 U.L.A. 602. Second, UPA section 19 provides
that "every partner shall at all times have access to and may inspect and copy any of [the
partnership's books]."Id. § 19,6 U.L.A. 598. The UPA section 19 inspection right is amethod
for policing the partners' duty of disclosure under UPA section 20 and also is a means by
which partners can protect themselves against wrongdoing and make informed decisions
concerning partnership operations and management. Finally, partners have information rights
pursuant to UPA sections 21, id. § 21(1), 6 U.L.A. 608 ("Every partner must account to the
partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits derived by him without the
consent of the other partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or
liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property."), and 22, id.-§ 22, 6
U.L.A. 650 ("Any partner shall have the right to a formal account as to partnership affairs..
139. The partnership disclosure cases demonstrate three categories in which the courts have
implemented fiduciary duty principles to mandate disclosure: (a) transactions in which parties
are negotiating to become partners; (b) self-dealing transactions involving a partner's transfer
of property to a partnership or acquisition of property from a partnership; and (c) transactions
involving a partner's purchase of a copartner's interest or a partner's sale of an interest to a
copartner. Vestal, supra note 138, at 729-35; see also CALUSON, supra note 2, § 12.05. In the
first category, persons negotiating to become partners generally have been held to fiduciary
standards and have been required to disclose material information. In the second category,
involving partner-partnership transactions, the partner's interest in the property and the cost
at which the partner obtained the property generally have been held material facts that the
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information. 4 ° The communitarian approach to partnership information disclosure
rules was continued in the RUPA, albeit with significant modifications. 4' The most
partner has a fiduciary duty to disclose. Opus Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 141 F.3d 1261,
1269 (8th Cir. 1998) (materiality requirement imposed); Libby v. L.J. Corp., 247 F.2d 78, 82
(D.C. Cir. 1957); Starr v. Int'l Realty, Ltd., 533 P.2d 165, 168-69 (Or. 1975). In the third
category, involving partner-partner transactions in which one partner has information that the
other partner does not have, the courts generally have imposed a fiduciary-based disclosure
obligation. Moserv. Williams, 443 S.W.2d 212,215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (discussing partner's
obligation to disclose contract for sale of partnership asset when purchasing copartner's
interest); Johnson v. Buck, 540 S.W.2d 393, 411-13 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976) (discussing
managing partner's obligation to disclose when purchasing copartner's partnership interest);
Peckham v. Johnson, 98 S.W.2d408,412-13 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) (partner failure to disclose
third-party bid for partnership assets).
140. The UPA does not contain a definitive statement of partner fiduciary duties. Instead,
UPA section 9(1) states that agency-law principles, presumably including fiduciary principles
derived from agency law, apply to partnerships. UNIF. P'sHIP ACT § 9(1), 6 U.L.A. 400-01
(stating that "[e]very partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business"); see
also id. § 4(3), 6 U.L.A. 250 (declaring that the "law of agency shall apply under this act").
Fiduciary duties are a standard part of agency law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 1 (1)
(1958) ("Agency is the fiduciary relation .... "). Further, UPA section 21 (1), entitled Partner
Accountable as a Fiduciary, requires that a partner account to the partnership for any benefit,
and hold as trustee for the partnership any profit, derived without the other partners' consent
from transactions connected with the partnership's formation, conduct, or liquidation or from
the use of partnership property. UNiF. P'sHP ACT § 21(1), 6 U.L.A. 608. Beyond this broad
requirement that partners account for certain self-dealing transactions, courts have held that a
wide variety of fiduciary duties apply to general partners. See, e.g., CALUSON, supra note 2,
at ch. 12 (discussing partnership fiduciary issues); Vestal, supra note 136, at 727-35.
Generally, courts have held that partners have duties of loyalty, care, fairness, and honesty
to the partnership and their copartners. Id. These duties can be separated into (a) a duty of
loyalty (including a duty not to usurp partnership opportunities, a duty not to compete with the
partnership, and a duty not to act adversely to the partnership); (b) a duty of good faith and fair
dealing; (c) a duty to exercise appropriate care in partnership management; and (d) a duty to
fully disclose matters that are material to the partnership and its business. Id. In addition, courts
have stated that these partnership fiduciary duties, in some form, extend from .the period of
preformation negotiations through termination of the partnership. See CALLISON, supra note
2, at § 12.11. UPA section 21(1) supports this conclusion by its reference to the "formation,
conduct, or liquidation of the partnership." UNIF. P'sHiP ACT § 21(1), 6 U.L.A. 608.
Under the UPA, partnership fiduciary duties are broad and somewhat nebulous and,
consequently, are subject to judicial expansion and contraction. It should be noted that the
courts have generally adopted a communitarian view of partnership fiduciary duties and have
prohibited partner transactions that would be acceptable if partners dealt with each other as
autonomous contracting parties. This communitarian premise extends to partners' personal use
of information provided to them by the partnership or by their copartners. Therefore, even
though partners have broad information disclosure obligations under the UPA and partnership
common law, disclosing partners also have broad protections against use of disclosed
information. The communitarian premise ofpre-RUPA partnership law can be said to balance
partner obligations and partner responsibilities.
141. The RUPA generally maintains the UPA's communitarian approach to information
sharing, at least as a statutory default rule. It also permits partners to contract for autonomy by
making the disclosure requirement amendable bythe partners' agreement. First, RUPA section
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important RUPA modifications involved partner fiduciary duties, which under pre-
RUPA law included a non-statutory disclosure duty. 4" The RUPA modifications to
403(c)(1) codifies the routine disclosure obligation implied by UPA section 18(e): "Each
partner and the partnership shall furnish to a partner. .. : (1) without demand, any information
concerning the partnership's business and affairs reasonably required for the proper exercise
of the partner's rights and duties under the partnership agreement or this [Act] ... ." REVISED
UNIn. P'SHI ACT § 403(c)(1) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 78 (Supp. 2000); HILLMAN, VESTAL
& WEIDNER, supra note 1, at 187-88. Notwithstanding this codification of the routine
disclosure requirement, RUPA section 103(a) makes RUPA section 403(c)(1) amendable by
the partnership agreement. REviSEDUNIF.P'SHIPACT § 103(a), 6 U.L.A. 16; HIL.MMA1,VESTAL
& WEIDNER, supra note 1, at 191-92.
Second, RUPA sections 403(a) and (b) guaranty partner access to partnership books and
records. Specifically, RUPA sections 403(a) and (b) provide:
(a) A partnership shall keep its books and records, if any, at its chief executive
office.
(b) A partnership shall provide partners and their agents and attorneys access to
its books and records. It shall provide former partners and their agents and
attorneys access to books and records pertaining to the period during which they
were partners. The right of access provides the opportunity to inspect and copy
books and records during ordinary business hours. A partnership may impose a
reasonable charge, covering the costs of labor and material, for copies of
documents furnished.
REVISED UNIF. P'sHw ACT § 403(a)-(b), 6 U.L.A. 56; HILMAN, VESTAL & WEIDNER, supra
note 1, at 180-87.
Third, RUPA section 403(c)(2) contains a demand-driven disclosure mechanism: "Each
partner and the partnership shall furnish to a partner: ... on demand, any other information
concerning the partnership's business and affairs, except to the extent the demand or the
information demanded is unreasonable or otherwise improper under the circumstances."
REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 403(c), 6 U.L.A. 78; HILLMAN, VESTAL & WEIDNER, supra note
1, at 188-89.
RUPA section 403(c)(2) narrows the UPA's demand-driven disclosure obligations in two
ways. Allan W. Vestal, The Disclosure Obligations of Partners Inter Se Under the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act of1994: Is the Contractarian Revolution Failing?, 36 WM. &MARY
L. REV. 1559, 1580-81 (1995). First, RUPA section 403(c)(1) uses the formulation
"information concerning the partnership's business and affairs" rather than the "all things
affecting the partnership" formulation in UPA section 20. Id. It is unclear whether the drafters
intended this narrowing. The official commentary states "Paragraph (2) continues the UPA rule
that partners are entitled, on demand, to any information concerning the partnership's business
and affairs." REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 403 cmt., 6 U.L.A. 57; HLLMAN, VESTAL &
WEIDNER, supra note 1, at 188-89. Second, RUPA section 403(c)(2) provides an exception to
the disclosure requirement where the demand or the information sought "is unreasonable or
otherwise improperunderthe circumstances." REvISEDUNIF. P'SHIACT§ 403(c)(2), 6 U.L.A.
56. The drafters recognized that this "qualification is new to the statutory formulation." Id. §
403 cmt., 6 U.L.A. 57. The official commentary further states that "[t]he burden is on the
partnership or partner from whom the information is requested to show that the demand is
unreasonable or improper." Id. As with the RUPA section 403(c)(1) non-demand-driven
disclosure requirement, the RUPA section 403 (c)(2) demand-driven disclosure requirement is
amendable by the partnership agreement. See id. § 103(a), 6 U.L.A. 16; HILLMAN, VESTAL&
WEIDNER, supra note 1, at 186-87.
142. Although the RUPA section 403 disclosure rules generally retain the communitarian
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premise of the original UPA, RUPA section 404's handling of partnership fiduciary duties and
obligations, including partner disclosure obligations in situations not governed by RUPA
section 403, moves the RUPA much farther down the path of treating partners as autonomous
contracting parties rather than as members of a reciprocal business community. Vestal, supra
note 141. RUPA section 404(a) contains the following exclusive statement of partnership
fiduciary duties: "The only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership and the other
partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care." REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(a), 6
U.L.A. 58. Section 104(a) provides that "[u]nless displaced by particular provisions of this
[Act], the principles of law and equity supplement this [Act]." Id. § 104(a), 6 U.L.A. 20. The
RUPA thereby attempts to displace common-law rules that coexisted with the UPA, including
common-law fiduciary duty rules. HILLMAN, VESTAL& WEIDNER, supra note 1, at 200-01.
Section 404(b) reduces the partners' duty of loyalty to three components. SeeREVISED UNIF.
P'sHn' ACT § 404(b), 6 U.L.A. 58. First, following the self-dealing proscription contained in
UPA section 21(l), RUPA section 404(b)(1) states that a partner must "account to the
partnership and hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or benefit derived by the partner in
the conduct and winding up of the partnership business" (but not during the period prior to the
partnership's formation) "or derived from a use by the partner of partnership property,
including the appropriation ofapartnership opportunity."Id. § 404(b)(1), 6 U.L.A. 58. Second,
RUPA section 404(b)(2) states that a partner must refrain from dealing adversely "with the
partnership in the conduct or winding up of the partnership business" (but, again, not during
the period prior to the partnership's formation). Id. § 404(b)(2), 6 U.L.A. 58. Third, section
404(b)(3) states that a partner must "refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct
of the partnership business before [dissolution]." Id. § 404(b)(3), 6 U.L.A. 58.
In addition to the duty of loyalty and the duty of care, section 404(d) sets forth an
"obligation" of good faith and fair dealing: "A partner shall discharge the duties to the
partnership and the other partners under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement and
exercise any rights consistently with the obligation ofgood faith and fair dealing."Id. § 404(d),
6 U.L.A. 58. The RUPA drafters believed that the good-faith and fair-dealing obligation arises
from the partners' contractual relationship; therefore, the RUPA does not treat it as an
independent fiduciary duty. Id. § 404(d) cnt., 6 U.L.A. 60-61. In addition, the drafters
expressly declined to flesh out the meanings of the terms "good faith" and "fair dealing" but
instead opted to "allow courts to develop their meaning based on the experience of real cases."
Id. § 404(d) cmt., 6 U.L.A. 59-60; HIU.MAN, VESTAL & WEIDNER, supra note 1, at 203-04.
Further, RUPA section 404(e) adds an element of partner autonomy to the fiduciary duty
and obligation formulation: "A partner does not violate a duty or obligation under this (Act]
or under the partnership agreement merely because the partner's conduct furthers the partner's
own interest." REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(e), 6 U.L.A. 58; HILLMAN, VESTAL &
WEIDNER, supra note 1, at 204-05. A comment to section 404(e) states that a partner is not a
trustee and is not held to the same standards of selflessness as a trustee. REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP
ACT § 404(e) cmt., 6 U.L.A. 61. Instead, the RUPA conceives that a partner's interests as a
principal and owner must be balanced against its duties and obligations as an agent and
fiduciary. The RUPA also recognizes that these roles sometimes conflict. Specifically, RUPA
section 404(f) elaborates on the concept of self-interest and permits partners to lend money to
and transact business with the partnership and, in so doing, to have the same rights and
obligations as nonpartners. Id. § 404(f), 6 U.L.A. 59; HILLMAN, VESTAL & WEIDNER, supra
note 1, at 206-07.
Finally, the RUPA continues the movement toward partner autonomy by permitting partners
to modify their fiduciary duties and obligations. RUPA section 103(b)(3) affords partners
broad, but not unlimited, rights to modify their fiduciary duties and obligations through the
partnership agreement. REVISEDUNIF. P'SHACT § 103(b)(3), 6 U.L.A. 16; HILLMAN, VESTAL
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partnership fiduciary duty rules evince a strong move toward the autonomy model,
and they also expand the ability of individual partners to use disclosed information. 43
&WEIDNER, supra note l, at 40-48. Similarly, RUPA section 103(b)(5) permits the partnership
agreement to prescribe standards by which the performance of the good-faith and fair-dealing
obligation is to be measured. REVISED UNnW. P'sHmp ACT § 103(b)(5), 6 U.L.A. 17.
The RUPA changes prior law with respect to partner disclosure obligations. First, RUPA
section 404 does not include disclosure obligations within its duty of loyalty listing and, to the
extent that the RUPA continues disclosure obligations beyond those expressed in RUPA
section 403, they may be said to come either under the penumbra of the contractual obligation
of good faith and fair dealing or under a nondisplaced common-law obligation. HILLMAN,
VESTAL & WEIDNER, supra note 1, at 189-93. The official commentary provides some
assistance in this regard: "In some situations the obligation of good faith includes a disclosure
component. Depending on the circumstances, a partner may have an affirmative disclosure
obligation that supplements the section 403 duty to render information." REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP
ACT § 404(d) cmt., 6 U.L.A. 61.
Second, the RUPA removes certain transactions from the purview of partnership law. These
transactions include those involving partner disclosure during the partnership formation stage,
those involving partner disclosure when transacting business with the partnership, and those
involving disclosure among partners purchasing and selling partnership interests from orto one
another. Id. § 404(b), 6 U.L.A. 58; Hn.LMAN, VESTAL & WEIDNER, supra note 1, at 207-10.
Instead, such transactions are deemed to be arm's-length transactions and the parties'
disclosure obligations are not to be determined under partnership law. For example, the
comments to RUPA section 404(b) state that the drafters eliminated the UPA section 21(1)
reference to the formation period "because of concern that the duty of loyalty could be
inappropriately extended to the.. . period when the parties are really negotiating at arms'
length." REVISED UNIF. P'sIpAcT § 404(b) cmt., 6 U.L.A. 59. Further, RUPA section 404(f)
provides that partners may transact business with the partnership, and as to each such
transaction "the rights and obligations of the partner are the same as those of a person who is
not a partner, subject to other applicable law." Id. § 404(f), 6 U.L.A. 59. Prior to the RUPA,
preformation transactions, partner-partnership transactions, and partner-partner transactions
were viewed through a fiduciary lens, and the courts imposed broad disclosure duties. Vestal,
supra note 138, at 727-35.
143. The RUPA provides reduced protection to partners who disclose information to their
copartners. As discussed above, prior to the RUPA the courts generally adopted a
communitarian view of partnership fiduciary duties and prohibited partner transactions that
might be otherwise acceptable if partners dealt with each other as autonomous contracting
parties. See supra notes 140-41. Therefore, because partners have broad information disclosure
obligations under pre-RUPA partnership law, disclosing partners also should have broad
protection against their copartners' use ofdisclosed information. The RUPA, on the otherhand,
narrows the partner fiduciary duty of loyalty to three discrete situations. First, partners must
account for property, profit, or benefit derived from conducting partnership business or from
using partnership property. Second, partners must refrain from dealing with the partnership as
or on behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the partnership. And third, partners must
refrain from competing with the partnership. These fiduciary duties arguably do not apply to
situations in which partners derive benefit frombusinesses other than partnership business, use
partner rather than partnership property, act in a manner adverse to partners, or compete with
partners. Thus, under a viable reading of RUPA section 404, partners may not be able to claim
a fiduciary duty breach against copartners who use valuable information disclosed to them.
Although the RUPA provides that partners also must discharge their duties and exercise their
rights in a manner consistent with the contract-based obligation of good faith and fair dealing,
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The problem with a pure community model is that business firms are voluntary,
wealth seeking, and impermanent. A model under which the members abnegate self-
interest, such as the mutual agency model of the general partnership, is fundamentally
flawed because firmparticipants onlyjoin the firm ifthey expect their long-term self-
interest, in all parts of their economic life, to be maximized.'" Further,
this obligation is undefined and is not as robust as a fiduciary duty. Further, RUPA section
404(e) waters down the good-faith requirements by stating that a partner does not violate this
obligation merely because the partner's conduct furthers its own interests. The point here is not
that a court can not find a breach when a partner uses information disclosed to it by a copartner.
Instead, it should be noted that the answers under the RUPA are less certain and therefore the
RUPA may engender less partner trust and confidence.
144. Although the underlying communitarian nature of the UPA may make sense in certain
business transactions in which partners contemplate surrendering autonomy, it creates
numerous problems for partners who intend to retain autonomy in spheres outside the
partnership. To the extent that partnership law does not adjust to ameliorate these problems,
and thereby increases the potential cost of the partnership form, it becomes less likely that
persons will choose to enter into partnerships. These problems are heightened for partnerships
that develop valuable information in the course of their business or that use valuable partner
information in connection with their business. See Vestal, supra note 138, at 746-57.
First, under the implied routine disclosure requirement of UPA section 18(e), partners have
a right to all information concerning those aspects of the partnership business with respect to
which they participate in management decisions. UwNF. P'SHIP ACT § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. 526
(1995). Therefore, even ifthe partnership or other partners have produced valuable information
through deliberate effort, individual partners have the right to receive, without demand, some
or all of this information. To the extent that partners agree that such information disclosure is
objectionable, they could reduce information flow ex ante by restricting partner-management-
participation rights. Further, the partners might attempt to limit partners' information rights
through specific ex ante disclosure limitations in the partnership agreement, while retaining a
more robust partner-management-participation role under section 18(e). However, the
enforceability of such a provision is uncertain and, furthermore, such limitations might be
undesirable since they could cause uninformed partners to participate in management decisions.
A second disclosure problem arises under UPA section 19, which provides that "[tihe
partnership books shall be kept, subject to any agreement between the partners, at the principal
place of business of the partnership, and every partner shall at all times have access to and may
inspect and copy any of them." UNIF. P'sHIP ACT § 19, 6 U.L.A. 598. The UPA does not
expressly permit modification of such access rights. Although courts might respect partnership
agreement provisions which limit access rights, particularly when necessary to protect trade
secrets and other confidential information, there is little case law on this issue. Assuming that
partners cannot or do not modify the section 19 disclosure obligation, the scope of the problem
depends on the definition ofpartnership "books." Again, few partnership cases define "books,"
and there is a risk that courts will give broad construction to a definition. Even under a
restrictive reading of UPA section 19-for example, requiring a nexus to financial audit or tax
preparation-a wide range of partnership records could be included as partnership "books."
Furthermore, a court could shift its focus from defining "books" to considering what records
are in fact kept by the partnership, and fashion a rule that gives partners access to all existing
partnership books and records. A broadjudicial construction of UPA section 19 would create
a significant risk that partnerships will be required to disclose valuable information to
individual partners.
Finally, a significant disclosure problem is caused by the UPA section 20 requirement that
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the community model in its purest form seems to be inconsistent with private
contractual modifications of the social arrangement and does not provide a
comfortable description of the private firm in which members must be allowed to
contractually arrange the economic terms of their partnership.'45
C. A Structural Modelfor Disclosure Rules in
Unincorporated Business Organizations
A more appropriate disclosure model would avoid both the atomistic aspects of the
autonomy model and the self-abnegation implied by the communitarian model, and
it would consider the actual legal relationships among the unincorporated business
organization's members. This structural model corrects the communitarian model by
recognizing thatunincorporatedbusiness organizations are nothypothetical contracts
occurring behind a veil of ignorance, but instead are devices through which actual
persons (who have legitimate preexisting property and other interests outside the
organization and knowledge of their positions and goals) establish a limited sphere
in which they act together for mutual benefit. The structural model does not require
an all-or-nothing complete system of autonomy or community, but pragmatically
focuses on overall relationships of the associating parties.
This more appropriate model combines the autonomy model's underlying regard
for party wealth maximization with the community model's recognition of both
internal and external social dimensions of the. firm. It allows for a range of
contractual modification without surrendering all aspects of the firm to private
reordering, and it establishes socially regarding default rules to alleviate skepticism
concerning the parties' contracting process. As to the information rights and use
restrictions within the unincorporated firm, this structural model would establish
default rules governing disclosure obligations within the sphere of the parties'
"[p]artners shall render on demand true and full information of all things affecting the
partnership to any partner or the legal representative of any deceased partner or partner under
legal disability." UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 20, 6 U.L.A. 602. This broad command can be a problem
in many partnerships. For example, if a coalition of U.S. research hospitals were to establish
a partnership to market their medical services to foreign health insurance companies,
information concerning the capacity, growth, and pricing of the partner-hospitals would be
important to the partnership's business and, presumably, this information could be a "thing-
affecting the partnership." Id. If so, under UPA section 20, each partner would be obligated to
disclose this information on demand. However, each partner would probably agree that
disclosure of its information to a competitor-partnerwould be undesirable. Although it can be
argued that the UPA section 20's reciprocal nature prevents partners from demanding access
to proprietary information due to a tit-for-tat concern that their copartners would also demand
their proprietary information, such an assumption should be presumed to work only when the
partners' information and secrecy needs are symmetrical. If one partner stands to gain more
from the secrets of its copartner than it stands to lose from disclosure to its copartner, UPA
section 20 could work to the detriment of the partner with the more valuable information.
145. The extent to which partners can modify their disclosure rights and obligations is
uncertain under the UPA. The RUPA makes the disclosure requirements broadly amendable
by contract. REVISED UNIF. P'sPAcT § 103,6 U.L.A. 42-43; HILuMAN, VESTAL& WEIDNER,
supra note I, at 191-92.
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association and would recognize that contracting parties generally can establish ex
ante disclosure rules through contract.
At the same time, however, the structural model corrects the autonomy model by
recognizing that unincorporated business organizations are not merely blank form
business contracts devoid of social context orpowerful participant expectations. The
law would establish both socially appropriate default rules and limits on party
modifications of such default rules. This would assure that specific business
organizations are both socially appropriate and consistent with party and social
expectations.
Furthermore, the general disclosure rules which operate in the absence of a
particular contract would take into account the other aspects of the parties' legal
relationship to one another and, in doing so, would recognize that in different
circumstances members can have different participation levels in the business
community which they create. When there is greater member participation, such as
when ownership and management authority converge, the law should assume greater
information disclosure rights and increased fiduciary duties." On the other hand,
when there is little or no convergence between ownership and management authority,
such as when certain members merely contribute capital and share only in the firm's
reward attributes, the law should assume reduced information disclosure rights and
reduced fiduciary duties. To a great extent, this has been the approach historically
taken in unincorporated business organization law. 47 Thus general partners, in which
management responsibility and agency authority are vested, generally have been
given broad information disclosure rights and obligations, and limited partners, which
historically have neither management responsibility nor agency authority, have been
given minimal information disclosure rights and obligations. Similarly, general
partners historically have had broad and robust fiduciary duties to one another and
the partnership, while limited partners historically have had no or weak fiduciary
duties.
General partners are more fully within the organization's sphere through their
participation as full members in the firm's control, risk, and reward attributes, and
limited partners have little connection with the finm other than through financial
participation. General partners come closer to the community pole of the autonomy-
community continuum and limited partners come closer to the autonomy pole of the
continuum. This approach helps make sense of disclosure rules in unincorporated
business law, but when rights and responsibilities are assigned without regard to the
members' positions within the organizational sphere, the results are incoherent and
dangerous.
146. This convergence theory arguably could apply to the extent ownership and personal
liability overlap but, in light of modem trends toward limited liability protection for all
enterprise members, this overlap is less likely. See Callison, supra note 19, at 163.
147. Id.; Deborah A. DeMott, Agency and the Unincorporated Firm: Reflections on Design
on the Same Plane ofInterest, 54 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 595 (1997) (discussing the importance
of differentiation between ownership and agency); see also Claire Moore Dickerson,
Equilibrium Destabilized: FiduciaryDuties Underthe Uniform LimitedLiability CompanyAct,
25 STETSON L. REv. 415,417, 442-43 (1995).
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IV. APPLYING THE STRUCTURAL MODEL TO LLCs
A. A Structural Approach to Disclosure and Duty Rules
What should be the information rights and fiduciary obligations of LLC
participants? As discussed above, there are two distinct types of the LLC form:
member-managed LLCs and manager-managed LLCs."4 ' In member-managed LLCs,
the members retain control over the firm's operations. 14 9 In manager-managed LLCs,
the firm's operations are controlledbymanagers who, although theycan be members,
participate in management solely in their capacity as managers." ° The control
attributes of participants in the two LLC forms can be compared to the control
attributes ofparticipants in the traditional general partnership and limited partnership
forms.' A member ofa member-managed LLC has the control attributes ofa partner
in a general partnership. Similarly, a manager of a manager-managed LLC has the
control attributes of a general partner in a limited partnership. Finally, a nonmanager
member of a manager-managed LLC has the control attributes of a limited partner in
a limited partnership.
These management participation characteristics should help define the statutory
information rights and fiduciary duties of various LLC participants. An appropriate
structural model for disclosure rights and fiduciary duties in unincorporated business
organizations would consider the actual legal relationships among the members and
would recognize that members can have different participation levels in the
organization. Under this model, when ownership andmanagement authority converge
the law should assume greater information disclosure rights and increased fiduciary
duties, and when there is little or no convergence between ownership and
management authority the law should assume reduced information disclosure rights
and reduced fiduciary duties.
This analysis suggests that members in member-managed LLCs should have the
broad information rights and fiduciary duties of partners in general partnerships.
Using the RUPA as the standard, such members would have the unrestricted right of
access to LLC books and records, the right without predicate demand to information
reasonably required for them to exercise any rights and duties relating to the LLC,
and the right upon reasonable and proper demand to all information concerning the
LLC. As to fiduciary duties under the RUPA, such members would have statutory
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care together with a nonfiduciary obligation of good
faith and fair dealing.
This analysis also suggests that members who also are managers in manager-
managed LLCs should have the broad information rights and fiduciary duties of
generalpartners in limitedpartnerships. Assuming the cross-references intheRULPA
to general partnership law are deemed to be to the RUPA,In then such member-
148. See supra text accompanying note 10.
149. See supra text accompanying note 11.
150. See supra text accompanying note 12.
151. The status-based risk attributes of all participants in both species of LLCs are
comparable to limited partners in a limited partnership or shareholders in a corporation.
152. REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHn'ACT § 1105 (amended 1985), 6A U.L.A. 302 (1995).
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managers would have the unrestricted right of access to LLC books and records, the
right without predicate demand to information reasonably required to exercise their
rights and duties relating to the LLC, and the right upon reasonable and proper
demand to all information concerning the LLC. As to fiduciary duties, such member-
managers would have statutory fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, together with a
nonfiduciary obligation of good faith and fair dealing.
Finally, this analysis suggests that nonmanager members in manager-managed
LLCs should have the narrow and weaker information rights and fiduciary duties of
limited partners in limited partnerships. If one adopts the limited partner analogy,
such nonmanager members would have a somewhat restricted statutory right to
information, which includes the right to inspect and copybasic firmrecords' and the
right to obtain from the managers
from time to time upon reasonable demand (i) true and full information regarding
the state of the business and financial condition of the [LLC], (ii) promptly after
becoming available, a copy of the [LLC's] federal, state, and local income tax
returns for each year, and (iii) other information regarding the affairs of the
[LLC] as is just and reasonable.'5 4
This nonmanager-member informationrightwouldbe substantiallynarrowerthan that
153. Id. § 305(1), 6A U.L.A. 167 ("Each limited partner has the right to... inspect and copy
any of the partnership records required to be maintained by Section 105 .... ").
RULPA section 105 requires the limited partnership to maintain a specific list of not very
helpful documents:
(a) Each limited partnership shall keep at the office referred to in Section 104(1)
the following:
(1) a current list of the full name and last known business address of each
partner, separately identifying the general partners (in alphabetical order) and the
limited partners (in alphabetical order);
(2) a copy of the certificate of limited partnership and all certificates of
amendment thereto, together with executed copies of any powers of attorney
pursuant to which any certificate has been executed;
(3) copies of the limited partnership's federal, state and local income tax
returns and reports, if any, for the three most recent years;
(4) copies of any then effective written partnership agreements and of any
financial statements of the limited partnership for the three most recent years; and
(5) unless contained in a written partnership agreement, a writing setting out:
(i) the amount of cash and a description and statement of the agreed value
of the other property or services contributed by each partner and which each
partner has agreed to contribute;
(ii) the times at which or events on the happening of which any additional
contributions agreed to be made by each partner are to be made;
(iii) any right of a partner to receive, or of a general partner to make,
distributions to a partner which include a return bf all or anypart of the partner's
contribution; and
(iv) any events upon the happening of which the limited partnership is to
be dissolved and its affairs wound up.
Id. § 105(a), 6A U.L.A. 88.
154. Id. § 305(2), 6A U.L.A. 167.
[Vol. 76:271
LIMITED LIA BILITY FIRMS
for members who participate in LLC management. Instead of access to all books and
records, the member would be given access to only a short list of basic documents. 55
Instead of receiving some information without a predicate demand, information is
received only following a reasonable demand. 56 Instead of access to all LLC
information, such members would have access only to limited information. On the
fiduciary duty side, under the limited partner analogy, a nonmanager member would
have no statutory fiduciary duties."5 Under this analysis, the ULLCA's dangerous
mismatch between the community model's information rights regime and the
autonomy model's fiduciary duty regime would be eliminated.
B. A Possibility for Redemption-the Re-R ULPA
The NCCUSL has appointed a drafting committee to prepare a new Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act ("Re-RULPA"). 5 s The Re-RULPA drafters have
noted that limited partnerships are intended for situations in which there is strong,
entrenched centralized management and passive investors. 59 Given this clear
statement that limited partnership use is anticipated for businesses in which some
owners exercise the firm's control attributes and other owners participate only in the
firm's reward attributes, the Re-RULPA drafters should consider where the
participants fit on the autonomy-community continuum and should draft disclosure
and fiduciary duty rules with this in mind. As set forth above, an appropriate
155. Compare id. §§ 105(a),305(l),6AU.L.A. 88,167 (access onlyto "partnership records
required to be maintained by section 105"), with REVISED UNIF. P'sHIPACT § 403(b) (amended
1997), 6 U.L.A. 78 (Supp. 2000) (access to "books and records" without limitation).
156. Compare REVISED UNwF. LTD. P'smIPAcT § 305(2), 6A U.L.A. 167 ("upon reasonable
demand... true and full information"), with REVISED UNIF. P's-npAcT § 403(c)(1), 6 U.L.A.
56 (specification of information required to be furnished "without demand").
157. Compare REVISEDUNIF. LTD.P'SHIPMACT art. 3, 6A U.L.A. 137-69 (no fiduciary duties
in article 3 limited partners), with id. art. 4, 6A U.L.A. 170-202 (fiduciary duties for general
partners through section 403). The courts have in some cases imposed limited fiduciary duties
on limited partners. See CALLSON, supra note 2, § 21.16 (discussing limited partner fiduciary
duties).
158. REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'sHP ACT (Proposed Revision Draft Mar. 2000),
http://www.law.upenn.edulbll/ulc/ulcframe.htnL
159. The prefatory note to Re-RULPA states:
Re-RULPA is a "stand alone" act, "de-linked" from the general partnership
act. To be able to stand alone, Re-RULPA incorporates many provisions from
RUPA and some from ULLCA....
... Re-RULPA therefore targets two types of enterprises that seem largely
beyond the scope of LLPs and LLCs: (i) sophisticated, manager-entrenched
commercial deals whose participants commit for the long term, and (ii) estate
planning arrangements (family limited partnerships). Re-RULPA accordingly
assumes that, more often than not, people utilizing the act will want:
" strong centralized management, strongly entrenched, and
* passive investors with little right to exit the entity.
Re-RULPA's rules, and particularly its default rules, have been designed to reflect
these assumptions.
Id. at prefatory note.
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structural model would consider the actual legal relationships among the members.
To the extent that owners participate in management and control, the law should
assume greater information disclosure rights and increased fiduciary duties, and to
the extent that they do not so participate, the law should assume reduced information
disclosure rights and reduced fiduciary duties. Thus, in a limited partnership, general
partners should have broad information rights and fiduciary duties, and limited
partners should have narrow information rights and fiduciary duties.
How does the current draft of the Re-RULPA stack up with respect to general
partner information rights and fiduciary duties? First, Re-RULPA section 407(a)(1)
provides general partners with the right to inspect and copy the limited partnership's
core "required records"' 6 and the right to inspect and copy "any other records
maintained by the limited partnership regarding the limited partnership's business,
affairs, and financial condition."'' The distinction between the core record inspection
rights and the noncore record inspection rights relates to the place of inspection. The
Re-RULPA also follows the RUPA and provides in section 407(b) that each general
partner and the limited partnership must provide to a general partner, "without
demand, any information concerning the limited partnership's business and affairs
reasonably required for the proper exercise of the general partner's rights and
duties,"" and, "on demand, any other information concerning the limited
partnership's business and affairs, except to the extent the demand or he information
demanded is unreasonable or otherwise improper under the circumstances."' 63 Thus,
the Re-RULPA follows the RUPA's communitarian bent with respect to general
partner information rights.
With respect to general partner duties, the Re-RULPA section 408 also follows the
RUPA and provides that general partners owe the limited partnership and the other
partners fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, and are bound in the exercise of their
duties to a nonfiduciary "obligation of good faith and fair dealing."'" Thus, the
RUPA's substantially modified communitarian premise continues to apply to Re-
RULPA general partners. Although the Re-RULPA likely imports many of the
fiduciary issues created by the RUPA, there is a sensible match between broad
information rights and fairly broad fiduciary duties.
With respect to limited partner information disclosure rights, Re-RULPA section
305(a) provides that, upon "10 days' written demand to the partnership, a limited
partner may inspect and copy" the limited partnership's core "required records.' 65
160. "Required records" are given narrow definition in Re-RULPA section I 11 (a), and
consist of core documents such as a list of the partners' names and addresses, a copy of
partnership's organizational documents, copies of tax returns and financial statements, and
copies of any record of partner consents and votes. Id. § 111 (a). Re-RULPA can therefore be
contrasted with the RUPA and the ULLCA, neither of which mandate that the entity keep
specified records.
161. Id. § 407(a)(2).
162. Id. § 407(b)(1).
163. Id. § 407(b)(2). The burden of proving that the information requested is unreasonable
or improper likely rests with the limited partnership or the general partner from whom
information is requested.
164. Id. § 408.
165. Id. § 305(a).
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This can be compared with the ULLCA's broader grant of nonmanager-member
access rights to all "records."'" Re-RULPA section 305(b) further provides that
limited partners may demand to "inspect and copy true and full information regarding
the state of the business and financial condition of the limited partnership and other
information regarding the affairs of the limited partnership.. . as is just and
reasonable."' 67 However, to obtain suchnoncore information the limitedpartnermust
seek the "information for a purpose reasonably related to [its] interest as a limited
partner," the demand must set forth with "reasonable particularity the information
sought and the [limited partner's] purpose for seeking the information," and the
information sought must be "directly connected to the limited partner's purpose.1 68
In addition, Re-RULPA section 305(g) states that the "limited partnership may
impose reasonable limitations on the use of information" provided to a limited
partner, 69 and Re-RULPA section 110 states that "the partnership agreement may
impose reasonable limitations on the availability and use of information... and may
define appropriate remedies, including liquid.ated damages, for a breach of any
reasonable" use limitation.' In the event of a dispute concerning demanded
information, the current comments to Re-RULPA section 305(c)(3) would impose the
burden of proof on the limited partner making the demand.""
Limited partner information rights under Re-RULPA would differ in substantial
ways from nonmanager-member rights undertheULLCA. First, rather than providing
limited partners with rights to all "records" broadly defined, the Re-RULPA provides
access only to a confined core of "required records." Second, rather than providing
general access on demand to other information concerning the company's business
or affairs, the Re-RULPA requires that limited partners first demonstrate a proper
purpose related to their interest and require a direct connection between the
information sought and the limited partner's purpose. Third, the Re-RULPA clearly
permits the partnership agreement to specify reasonable limitations on information
availability and use. Thus, the limited partner information rules under the Re-RULPA
are consistent with the limited partners' lack of participation in management and
control. Limited partners have a right to noncore information only if they can
demonstrate that such information somehow relates to their actual interests as
partners.
With respect to limited partner fiduciary duties, Re-RULPA section 306(a)
generally follows the ULLCA's lead and provides that limited partners owe no
fiduciary duties to the limited partnership or to other partners." The NCCUSL
drafting committee is considering further choices creating limited partner duties to the
extent that limited partners participate (or perhaps are vested with power to
participate) in limitedpartnership management."r Thus, the fiduciary duty rules under
166. UNiF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 408(a), 6A U.L.A. 462-63 (1995).
167. REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHI' ACT § 305(b) (Proposed Revision Draft Mar. 2000).
168. Id.
169. Id. § 305(g). In the event of a dispute, "the limited partnership has the burden of
proving reasonableness." Id.
170. Id. § 110(b)(3).
171. Id. § 305(c) cmt.
172. Id. § 306(a).
173. Id. § 306(b) (two versions).
2001]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
Re-RULPA generally track the limited partners' participation rights. The drafters
should consider extending limited partner fiduciary duties to cover the personal use
of partnership information disclosed to the limited partners. Under Re-RULPA
section 306(c), limited partners are required to discharge their duties (if any) and
exercise their rights in accordance with the obligation of good faith and fair
dealing.
M
The purpose of this discussion is not to fully critique the information disclosure and
fiduciary obligation rules of the Re-RULPA, 75 but rather to demonstrate that the
NCCUSL drafters are capable ofconceptualizingparticipants' information rights and
fiduciary duties based on their differentiated roles within the organization. One can
hope that the NCCUSL will consider its entire process of drafting unincorporated
business organization statutes to be an evolutionary one holistically involving general
partnerships, limited liability companies, and limited partnerships, and the NCCUSL
will acknowledge their success in drafting a limited partnership statute recognizing
that partners have differentiated roles and that their information rights and fiduciary
duties should track their roles. The Re-RULPA presents the NCCUSL with yet
another chance to get the disclosure rules and fiduciary duties of participants right,
and provides a reason for the NCCUSL to revisit decisions made in the ULLCA and
ultimately to restate the ULLCA provisions. There simply is no reason to set a
uniform act in concrete until it is right, particularly when work continues on related
statutes and when it has not been widely adopted. The ULLCA's information rules
are inferior and should be changed to follow the formulation which appears to be
forthcoming in the Re-RULPA.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrates that legislative drafters can commit profound errors when
they combine provisions from dissimilar business organization forms without
adequately considering underlying theory. It proposes a theory, which focuses on the
member's participation in an entity's management and control in addition to
participation in economic benefits and losses, to distinguish entityparticipants' rights
and obligations. It shows how this appropriate theory, when applied to limited
liability company information rights and use restrictions, would remedy the ULLCA's
errors and would provide a logic and consistency presently lacking in most state LLC
statutes. Finally, and importantly, it points out the fact that the NCCUSL is engaged
174. Id. § 306(c). Re-RULPA section 306(c) also states that "the [good-faith and fair-
dealing] obligation stated in this subsection displaces any obligation of good faith and fair
dealing at common law or otherwise." Id. The drafters' comments indicate the drafters' intent
that the obligation should be used only to protect agreed-upon arrangements from conduct that
is manifestly beyond what a reasonable person could have contemplated when the contractual
arrangements were made. Id. § 306(c) cmt. Thus, section 306(c) appears to contemplate
limiting the good-faith obligation beyond the RUPA version of the same language, and may
limit good faith to something approaching the UCC "honesty in fact" standard. Compare id.
§ 306(c), with U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), 2-103(b) (2000). This further deviation from an already
limited RUPA standard should be reconsidered.
175. Such critiques are possible and will be made. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 3, at 981-
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in an ongoing entity drafting process. Further developments and insights, including
those derived from drafting a New Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, can
figure in, correcting the mistakes of ULLCA. In light of the fact that the NCCUSL
and others will likely be called on to draft an enormously complex unified business
entity statute, it is critical that appropriate and socially desirable theories of entity
forms and participant rights and responsibilities be discussed, identified, and
implemented.

